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ABSTRACT 
Does copyright violate the First Amendment?  Professor Melville Nimmer asked this question forty 
years ago, and then answered it by concluding that copyright itself is affirmatively speech protective.  
Despite ample reason to doubt Nimmer’s response, the Supreme Court has avoided an independent, 
thoughtful, plenary review of the question.  Copyright has come to enjoy an all-but-categorical 
immunity to First Amendment constraints.  Now, however, the Court faces a new challenge to its 
back-of-the-hand treatment of this vital conflict.  In Golan v. Holder the Tenth Circuit considered 
legislation (enacted pursuant to the Berne Convention and TRIPS) “restoring” copyright protection 
to millions of foreign works previously thought to belong to the public domain.  The Tenth Circuit 
upheld the legislation, but not without noting that it appeared to raise important First Amendment 
concerns.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  This article addresses the issues in the Golan 
case, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Court.  This article first considers the Copyright 
and Treaty Clauses, and then addresses the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment.  The discussion endorses an understanding of that relationship in which the 
Amendment is newly seen as paramount, and copyright is newly seen in the image of the 
Amendment. 
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DAVID L. LANGE, RISA J. WEAVER & SHIVEH ROXANA REED* 
INTRODUCTION 
Upon enacting the Bill of Rights, our Founders guaranteed that the federal 
government would make no law abridging the freedom of speech; yet, Congress 
routinely enacts laws that do exactly that, ostensibly in the name of some more 
worthy goal.  In particular, the United States copyright laws are, quite simply, 
government-sanctioned abridgements of speech.  While the courts have consistently 
declined to view copyright law in this light, the fact remains that our freedom of 
expression is severely constrained by the monopolies granted by the government to 
individuals and institutions in the form of copyrights.  The stated purpose of 
copyright (and patents) is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”1  
Progress is achieved when the public benefits from the creativity of others, by 
building on what has come before to further create.  Progress is achieved when a 
group of student musicians spends months practicing a complicated symphony 
composed by Dmitri Shostakovich and performs that symphony for family and 
classmates, each member of the orchestra contributing his own expressive qualities 
to the notes written by a Russian composer they never met.  Is progress achieved 
when Congress suddenly tells those musicians that the symphony previously made 
freely available to them through the public domain is no longer available because it 
has decided to “restore” Mr. Shostakovich’s copyright?2 
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1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 A copyright, one might add, that Mr. Shostakovich never, in fact, possessed because the 
United States did not have copyright relations with the Soviet Union at the time of the symphony’s 
composition.  How can one restore what never existed?  See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1095 
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The statute that allows Congress to effect this restoration is section 104A of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, which was added after the United States signed the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in 
1994.3  Section 104A restores copyright protection to works by foreign authors who 
previously lost (or never had) U.S. copyright protection for their works because they 
did not comply with United States formalities, such as notice and deposit, or because 
we had no copyright relations with their home countries at the time their work was 
created.4  Restoration of copyright is available only for works that are still under 
copyright in the author’s country of origin.5  Restoring copyright protection 
essentially removes a work from the public domain—what once was free for all to use 
now requires license fees that can be well beyond the financial means of individuals 
and organizations that have previously made use of the works.6 
I. BACKGROUND 
Understanding why United States copyright law now contains a provision 
allowing for the restoration of copyright requires a brief foray into the area of world 
trade and globalization.  After World War II, many of the world’s nations formed the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in order to promote free trade by 
removing protectionist barriers, such as tariffs and quotas.7  The GATT is 
periodically revised at negotiating sessions known as “rounds” named for the location 
where they are held.8  The Uruguay Round met from 1986 until 1994, out of which 
emerged the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the TRIPS Agreement, the first 
worldwide trade agreement covering intellectual property rights (“IPRs”), including 
copyright.9 
In addition to prescribing its own rules for IPRs, TRIPS incorporates certain 
provisions of earlier multilateral IP treaties, most importantly for our purposes, 
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”).10  The Berne Convention came into being in 
1886 with nine original members, including the colonial powers of the day, France, 
                                                                                                                                                
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011); U.S. Supreme Court Will Review 
Constitutionality of Restoring Copyrights in Foreign Works:  Court Grants Cert in Stanford Law 
School Fair Use Project Case Golan v. Holder, STAN. L. SCH. NEWS CENTER (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/news/pr/135. 
3 Golan, 609 F.3d at 1080. 
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A(a), 104A(h)(6)(C) (2006). 
5 Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B). 
6 Golan, 609 F.3d at 1082. 
7 See Loretta F. Smith, The GATT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 919, 919, 924–25 
(1991). 
8 See id. at 942. 
9 The final agreement of the Uruguay Round was signed on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, 
Morocco and is entitled Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.  TRIPS 
is Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-TRIPS.pdf. 
10 TRIPS supra note 9, at art. 9.  Only Article 6bis, having to do with moral rights, is exempted 
from incorporation. 
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Spain, and Great Britain; membership today includes more than 150 countries.11  
Notably absent from the Convention for many years was the United States, which 
did not accede until 1989, when negotiations were already underway to create the 
WTO and TRIPS.12 
The fundamental difficulty in achieving worldwide harmony in copyright law is 
that civil law countries (such as France and most of Continental Europe) and 
common law countries (such as Great Britain and the United States) have 
dramatically different justifications for copyright.  The civil law countries view 
copyright as a “natural” right residing in the author, who invests the work with his 
personality.13  This view favors very strong protections with few exceptions—authors 
are inherently “entitled” to control their creations.14  Common law countries, on the 
other hand, view copyright as an economic bargain—the temporary monopoly is 
granted to the creator as an incentive for creation and to compensate him for his 
investment of time and money before the work is ultimately dedicated to the public.15  
This view endorses narrow protection with broader exceptions to protect the “public 
good.”16  Our constitutional requirement that copyright be for “limited times,” along 
with fair use exceptions and First Amendment protection, is intended to ensure that 
private creators’ rights do not deprive the public of its rights.17 
To this end, the Berne Convention is not a self-executing treaty in the United 
States—its provisions are only enforceable to the extent that Congress explicitly 
implements them through domestic law.18  Congress passed the Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988 (“BCIA”) to amend the United States Copyright Act as 
necessary to comport with the Berne Convention.19  Notably, section 12 of the BCIA 
explicitly declined to extend “copyright protection for any work that is in the public 
                                                                                                                                                
11 Natalie Wargo, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 403, 403 n.5 (1990). 
12 Id.  Indeed, Congress had begun the process of bringing U.S. copyright law into compliance 
with the Berne Convention much earlier, during the drafting of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.  
Under the 1909 Act, which the 1976 Act replaced, authors were awarded an initial copyright term of 
twenty-eight years and had to actively renew their copyright in order to secure a second twenty-
eight-year term.  The 1976 Act eliminated the renewal requirement and instituted a new term of 
fifty years post mortem auctoris (fifty years after the death of the author, or “life-plus-fifty” as it is 
commonly phrased), both of which changes comported with the Berne Convention, despite the fact 
that the U.S. had not formally acceded to the Berne Convention at that point.  R. Anthony Reese, Is 
the Public Domain Permanent?:  Congress’s Power to Grant Exclusive Rights in Unpublished Public 
Domain Works, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 531, 541 (2007).  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998 extended the term again to life-plus-seventy years in order to harmonize our term with 
that of the European Union, although the Berne Convention’s minimum standard remains life-plus-
50. 
13 MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 
ed., 3d ed. 1999) (1989). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 6. 
16 Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures:  The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and 
the Case of Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1051–71 (2011). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 18. 
18 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) 
[hereinafter BCIA]. 
19 Id.  Along with the change in term, supra note 12, other formalities, including the 
requirement that all copies have affixed copyright notices, were eliminated, along with other 
substantive changes. 
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domain in the United States,”20 a condition that was arguably required by the Berne 
Convention.21 
Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention states, “[t]his Convention shall apply to all 
works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the 
public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.”22  
As previously mentioned, this Article was incorporated into TRIPS, which the United 
States signed at inception, on April 15, 1994.  In order to implement the Marrakesh 
Agreement and TRIPS, President Clinton signed the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act (“URAA”) on December 8, 1994 (with an effective date of January 1, 1995).23  
Section 514 of the URAA is titled “Restored Works” and amends the United States 
Copyright Act to add section 104A, “Copyright in Restored Works.”24 
In sum, section 514/section 104A requires copyright to be restored in any foreign 
works that are in the public domain in the United States for reasons other than 
expiry of term.25  The three most common reasons for foreign works to have fallen 
into our public domain are, (1) failure to comply with formalities when they were still 
required (such as affixing copyright notice to all copies or registering for renewal of 
copyright term); (2) lack of copyright relations with the foreign author’s country of 
residence at the time of publication; and (3) lack of protection under U.S. law for the 
particular medium (e.g., sound recordings prior to 1972).26  Works whose copyrights 
are restored under section 514 gain a term of protection equal to what it would have 
been if the work had been properly protected initially.27  Upon either filing with the 
United States Copyright Office a Notice of Intent to Enforce a Restored Copyright or 
directly notifying a user of a work that the copyright has been restored,28 a foreign 
                                                                                                                                                
20 BCIA, supra note 18, § 12. 
21 37 C.F.R. § 201–02 (2005); see Copyright Office, Rules and Regulations Library of Congress, 
60 FED. REG. 50414 (Sept. 25, 1995) (“The United States arguably failed to conform its law fully to 
the Berne Convention in 1989 when it declined to interpret Article 18(1) on restoration as being 
mandatory.”). 
22 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 18(1) (Sept. 9, 1886) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
23 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter 
URAA].  The URAA was neither negotiated nor passed in typical fashion; Congress played no part in 
writing the bill—it was handled entirely by the Executive Branch and the U.S. Trade 
Representative—and Congress was only permitted to vote “yes” or “no” without imposing any 
changes.  Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States Copyright 
Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J. LAW & ARTS, 157, 173, 185–86, 231 (1996); 
see also David Nimmer, David Nimmer on the Constitutionality of Anti-Bootlegging legislation, 2008 
EMERGING ISSUES 1131 (Nov. 27, 2007) (noting that the URAA “broke new ground” with an “eerie 
abdication of oversight”). 
24 URAA, supra note 23, § 514. 
25 Id. (noting that section 514(h)(3) defines “eligible country” to be any country “other than the 
United States” that is a member of the WTO or the Berne Convention or the subject of a presidential 
proclamation to that effect). 
26 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9A.04 (2011) 
[hereinafter NIMMER]. 
27 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2006); see generally NIMMER, supra note 26, § 9A.02 (providing a 
variety of examples relating to the duration of a work’s restored protection based on when it was 
originally published and which U.S. copyright law was in effect at that time). 
28 Arguably, this is a formality in contravention of the Berne Convention.  However, in its 
regulations governing such filings, the United States Copyright Office stated, “[w]e believe that such 
a filing is not inconsistent with the Berne Convention because Article 18(3) of the Berne Convention 
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copyright owner may seek remedies for copyright infringement as described in 
Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act of 1976.29 
Section 514 makes some allowances for “reliance parties,” those who relied on 
the work’s public domain status in using the work directly (such as publishing copies 
of the original) or in creating a derivative work.30  If a reliance party continues to 
make use of the work beyond the twelfth month after the owner files the Notice of 
Intent to Enforce, the owner may seek remedies under the Copyright Act.31  In the 
case of reliance parties who have created derivative works, they may continue 
exploiting those derivative works, but only upon paying the owner “reasonable 
compensation,” which may be set by a U.S. district court if the parties cannot agree 
on an amount.32 
II. GOLAN’S SLOW MARCH TO THE SUPREME COURT 
This brings us to the facts of Golan v. Holder.33  Lawrence Golan, the named 
plaintiff, is the conductor of the University of Denver orchestra.34  With an annual 
budget of only $4000 for music licensing fees, the school cannot afford to purchase or 
license its entire repertoire and must rely on works in the public domain.35  Aided by 
the Fair Use Project at The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, 
Mr. Golan filed suit in 2001, asserting that section 514 unconstitutionally removes 
works from the public domain.36  The case was decided in 2005 by Lewis Babcock, 
Chief Judge for the District Court of Colorado, on competing motions for summary 
judgment.37 
A. The First District Court Opinion 
Chief Judge Babcock framed his decision in terms of three issues:  (1) whether 
Congress exceeded its authority in enacting section 514; (2) whether the 
government’s basis for section 514 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
                                                                                                                                                
specifically permits member nations to determine ‘conditions’ for applying the principles of 
restoration.”  See Copyright Office, supra note 21, at 50416. 
29 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c)–(e). 
30 URAA, supra note 23, § 514(d). 
31 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2). 
32 Id. § 104A(d)(3). 
33 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010).  The case as originally filed was Golan v. 
Ashcroft; however, that earlier iteration of the case involved a challenge to the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 which was dismissed because it was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft.  Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004); Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  Alberto Gonzales then replaced John Ashcroft as attorney general, 
and our review of the cases begins with the first opinion under the name Golan v. Gonzales.  When 
Eric Holder replaced Alberto Gonzales as attorney general, the case became Golan v. Holder. 
34 Marc Parry, Supreme Court Takes-Up Scholars’ Rights, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29, 
2011), available at http://chronicle.com/article/A-Professors-Fight-Over/127700. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Golan v. Gonzales, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808, 1809 (D. Colo. 2005). 
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interest; and (3) whether section 514 impermissibly violates the plaintiffs’ First and 
Fifth Amendment rights.38  Chief Judge Babcock devoted the most attention to the 
first issue, for which he analyzed copyright history from passage of the first copyright 
law, the 1790 Copyright Act, and concluded that Congress had removed works from 
the public domain with that enactment.39  Because three of the original thirteen 
states did not have statutory copyright laws in effect prior to 1790, those three states 
had only common law copyright protection, which lapsed upon publication, thereby 
causing published works to fall into the public domain.40  The 1790 Copyright Act 
applied to “any map, chart, book, or books already printed within these United 
States,”41 which necessarily included works published in states that had no statutory 
copyright protection.  Because those public domain works were removed from the 
public domain when their authors sought statutory protection under the new federal 
law, Chief Judge Babcock viewed this as evidence that Congress had determined that 
the practice of removing works from the public domain was “constitutionally 
permissible.”42 
On the second issue, with little discussion, Chief Judge Babcock concluded that 
the government’s attempt “to promote protection of American authors by ensuring 
compliance with the Berne Convention within our own borders . . . is rationally 
related to, and constitutes a rational basis for, URAA [s]ection 514.”43  Lastly, Chief 
Judge Babcock did not take seriously the plaintiffs’ claim that their First 
Amendment rights were infringed, disposing of that argument in one sentence:  “I see 
no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright 
enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”44  He gave the Fifth 
Amendment due process claim slightly more thought, but concluded that, although 
section 514 provides authors with retroactive benefits, it does not impose retroactive 
burdens on users and, therefore, does not offend due process.45  In light of his 
conclusions, Chief Judge Babcock granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied the plaintiffs’.46 
B. The First Tenth Circuit Opinion 
Plaintiffs appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit, which issued its first opinion in 
2007.47  The court first evaluated whether section 514 exceeds Congress’s authority, 
and then whether section 514 requires First Amendment scrutiny.48  On the first 
                                                                                                                                                
38 Id. at 1810. 
39 Id. at 1813. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1817. 
43 Id. at 1821. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1822. 
46 Id. 
47 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).  Plaintiffs once again raised the CTEA 
argument, but the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Colorado district court and other courts that had 
heard similar claims and held that Eldred v. Ashcroft precluded challenges to the CTEA.  Id. at 
1185. 
48 Id. at 1186–87. 
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question, the court concluded that Congress’s goal of compliance with the Berne 
Convention was not “so irrational or so unrelated to the aims of the Copyright Clause 
that it exceeds the reach of congressional power.”49  There is nothing remarkable in 
this conclusion, as it is the same conclusion as that reached by other courts to have 
considered the question, including the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.50 
What is remarkable about the Tenth Circuit’s opinion is its conclusion that 
section 514, by removing works from the public domain, alters the “traditional 
contours of copyright—the peg upon which the Eldred decision hangs—and, 
therefore, demands First Amendment scrutiny.51  In the Tenth Circuit’s view: 
Until [section] 514, every statutory scheme preserved the same sequence.  A 
work progressed from (1) creation; (2) to copyright; (3) to the public domain.  
Under [section] 514, the copyright sequence no longer necessarily ends with 
the public domain: indeed, it may begin there.  Thus, by copyrighting works 
in the public domain, the URAA has altered the ordinary copyright 
sequence.52 
The Tenth Circuit rejected all of the government’s arguments that removing 
works from the public domain had, in fact, been a traditional part of copyright law, 
including the argument that had been successful at the district court level, namely 
that the 1790 Copyright Act illustrated the Founders’ comfort with removing works 
from the public domain:  “Given the scarcity of historical evidence, we cannot 
conclude that the Framers viewed removal of works from the public domain as 
consistent with the copyright scheme they created.  Nor do we discern at the dawn of 
the Republic any burgeoning tradition of removing works from the public domain.”53 
The court also characterized as unusual, rather than traditional, the two other 
instances of Congress ostensibly allowing public domain works to be copyrighted, 
both of which took place in response to world wars.54  Although the Eldred Court 
created from whole cloth the notion that First Amendment scrutiny of copyright laws 
                                                                                                                                                
49 Id. at 1187. 
50 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  Eldred involved a challenge to the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act, which lengthened the term of copyright to life-plus-seventy years to 
align with European Union law.  Id. at 193.  The Supreme Court upheld the extension as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s power under the copyright clause and also concluded that, although copyright 
laws were not immune from First Amendment scrutiny, such scrutiny was only necessary when the 
“traditional contours of copyright” were altered.  Id. at 221.  
51 Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1187–88. 
52 Id. at 1189. 
53 Id. at 1191. 
54 Id. at 1191–92.  The court noted: 
[T]he government argues that the wartime acts of Dec. 18, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-
102, 41 Stat. 368, and the Emergency Copyright Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-258, 
55 Stat. 732, removed works from the public domain by granting the President 
authority to give foreign authors additional time to comply with copyright 
requirements.  However, a review of the historical record reveals that these 
emergency wartime bills, passed in response to exigent circumstances, merely 
altered the means by which authors could comply with procedural rules for 
copyright; these bills were not explicit attempts to remove works from the public 
domain. 
Id. 
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is only necessary when the traditional contours of copyright are altered, lower courts 
are now bound to analyze copyright laws within that framework.  Because section 
514 removes works from the public domain, which is not a traditional contour of 
copyright, and because the plaintiffs have a First Amendment speech interest in 
using those public domain works, the Tenth Circuit concluded that section 514 must 
be given full First Amendment scrutiny, which the district court did not do.55  
Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court for the appropriate First 
Amendment review.56 
C. The Second District Court Opinion 
On remand, the case was decided once again by Chief Judge Babcock under 
standard First Amendment jurisprudence.  The initial step in traditional First 
Amendment analysis is to determine whether the law in question is content-neutral 
or content-based, which in turn determines the level of scrutiny applied to the law 
and the level of importance that the government must demonstrate in order to 
sustain the law. 
The parties and Chief Judge Babcock agreed that section 514 is a content-
neutral regulation of speech.57  As will be demonstrated in Part V, plaintiffs should 
not have conceded this fact and should have argued that section 514 is content-based 
and thereby requires a higher level of scrutiny.  Alternatively, as Part V also posits, 
plaintiffs could have argued that regardless of the nature of the speech regulation 
contemplated by section 514, the statute cannot stand against a First Amendment 
phrased as it is—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”58  
The purpose in this section, however, is merely to outline the analysis undertaken by 
the district court of a concededly content-neutral statute. 
In the words of the court, 
‘A content-neutral regulation [of speech] will be sustained under the First 
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to 
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more 
speech than necessary to further those interests.’  While a content-neutral 
restriction must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest’ unrelated to the suppression of free speech, it ‘need not be the least 
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.’  The requirement of narrow 
tailoring is satisfied so long as the restriction promotes a substantial 
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
restriction . . . .  ‘So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader 
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,’ the restriction will not 
                                                                                                                                                
55 Id. at 1194. 
56 Id. at 1197. 
57 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009). 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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be invalid simply because ‘the government’s interest could be adequately 
served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.’59 
The government offered three interests which, in its view, are significant enough 
to justify the burden on speech imposed by section 514:  (1) compliance with treaty 
obligations; (2) protection of U.S. copyright owners’ interests; and (3) correction of 
“historic inequities wrought on foreign authors who lost their United States 
copyrights through no fault of their own.”60 
Chief Judge Babcock acknowledged that compliance with international treaties 
is an important governmental interest but pointed out that even a treaty is subject to 
constitutional limitations, including the First Amendment.61  In keeping with 
conventional First Amendment analysis, Chief Judge Babcock considered whether 
section 514 is “substantially broader than necessary to achieve” the goal of complying 
with the Berne Convention and TRIPS.62  As part of that analysis, Chief Judge 
Babcock had to determine whether section 514 excludes a substantial amount of 
speech from First Amendment protection, the “unprotected speech.”  The government 
pointed out that the reliance provisions of section 514 protect plaintiffs from liability 
for copying that occurred before the copyright was restored and allow plaintiffs two 
options with respect to derivative works—one year in which to sell or use copies 
made before restoration of copyright, or payment of a royalty for exploitation beyond 
the one-year period.63  This constitutes the “protected speech,” but it leaves 
unprotected “any speech that involves copying more than one year after notice has 
been filed, and any derivative works made after notice is filed and without payment 
of a royalty.”64  In Chief Judge Babcock’s view, this amount of unprotected speech is a 
substantial amount, which necessitates determining whether that unprotected 
speech is or is not “‘tied to the Government’s interest’ in complying with the Berne 
Convention.”65 
Plaintiffs argued that Article 18 of the Berne Convention allows member nations 
discretion in implementing copyright restoration statutes, and Chief Judge Babcock 
ruled that in light of this discretion, “Congress could have complied with the Berne 
Convention without interfering with a substantial amount of protected speech . . . .”66  
Thus, by limiting the First Amendment speech rights of reliance parties, section 514 
burdens speech in a way that is not required by the Berne Convention and is, 
therefore, not tied to the government’s interest.  Because those speech limitations are 
not tied to the government’s interest in complying with the Berne Convention, Chief 
Judge Babcock found that section 514 is “substantially broader than necessary to 
achieve the government’s interest” and that summary judgment for plaintiffs was 
appropriate on that question.67 
                                                                                                                                                
59 Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1170–71 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
60 Id. at 1172. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1173. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. (citations omitted). 
66 Id. at 1174. 
67 Id. at 1174–75. 
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As to the government’s second justification for section 514, that it protects U.S. 
authors’ interests abroad, Chief Judge Babcock found that it was “largely intertwined 
with its argument regarding compliance with Article 18 of the Berne Convention—a 
justification which has been rejected as insufficient to justify the infringement of 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights above.”68  The government made a half-hearted 
attempt to argue that by not protecting foreign authors’ restoration rights, the 
United States opens the door to “reprisals” by other Berne Convention members 
against our authors; however, Chief Judge Babcock disposed of that argument by 
simply pointing to the text of the Berne Convention.  The Berne Convention only 
allows for reprisals against nationals of countries that are not members of the Berne 
Convention. Because the United States is a member of the Berne Convention, the 
reprisals article does not apply.69  Therefore, summary judgment for plaintiffs was 
appropriate on that issue.70 
Lastly, Chief Judge Babcock addressed the government’s argument that it has a 
significant interest in correcting historical inequities by restoring U.S. copyright 
protection to foreign authors who lost it through no fault of their own.71  The force of 
this argument is blunted by the fact that section 514 itself creates further inequities 
in that it applies only to foreign authors.72  A U.S. national who lost his U.S. 
copyright for failing to comply with formalities cannot have his copyright restored 
under section 514.  As Chief Judge Babcock points out, “[r]ather than correct an 
historic inequity, [s]ection 514 appears to create an inequity where one formerly did 
not exist.  The Government proffers no evidence showing how granting foreign 
authors copyrights in the United States—yet denying similar protections to United 
States authors—could constitute an important Government interest.”73  Thus, 
summary judgment for plaintiffs was appropriate on this issue as well.74  In sum, 
Chief Judge Babcock found that section 514 burdened substantially more speech 
than necessary in order to achieve compliance with the Berne Convention and 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.75 
Unsurprisingly, the government appealed Chief Judge Babcock’s ruling to the 
Tenth Circuit.  However, the plaintiffs also appealed, on the grounds that: 
[Chief Judge Babcock’s decision] fails to adjudicate the question of whether 
section 514 of the URAA is unconstitutional on its face; fails to enjoin 
Defendant Holder, his successor, and his subordinates from enforcing 
copyrights created by section 514 for all works that have previously been in 
the public domain; and fails to order Defendant Peters, her successor, and 
her subordinates to cancel all copyright registrations of works whose 
                                                                                                                                                
68 Id. at 1175 (emphasis omitted). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 1176–77. 
71 Id. at 1176.  The government seems to forget here that section 514 also restores copyright 
protection to authors who failed to comply with formalities such as notice and renewal, the blame for 
which failure must lie squarely with the authors. 
72 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(3) (2006) (defining an “eligible country” as one “other than the 
United States”). 
73 Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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copyright status was restored under section 514 of the URAA and to refrain 
from issuing registrations for any such works in the future.76 
D. The Second Tenth Circuit Opinion 
In June 2010, the Tenth Circuit issued its second opinion in the case, reversing 
the district court and finding that section 514 does not violate the First 
Amendment.77  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, and for free speech advocates, 
constitutional challenges to statutes are reviewed de novo, giving the Tenth Circuit 
justification to substitute its own judgment in place of the district court’s judgment.78  
The parties and the court once again agreed that section 514 is a content-neutral 
regulation of speech.79  The government offered the same three justifications for 
section 514 that it had advanced at the district court level:  (1) compliance with 
treaties, (2) protecting U.S. authors’ copyright interests abroad, and (3) remedying 
past inequities.80  This time, however, the court agreed with the government that it 
has “a substantial interest in protecting American copyright holders’ interests 
abroad, and section 514 is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”81 
The court began by evaluating the government’s interest and whether it was 
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”82  The plaintiffs argued that the 
government was attempting a “‘reallocation of speech interests’ between American 
reliance parties and American copyright holders” and that this reallocation does not 
qualify as an important governmental interest.83  The court acknowledged that the 
plaintiffs have a First Amendment interest in using the public domain works, but it 
countered their interest by pointing out that U.S. authors also have a First 
Amendment right to secure their “economic and expressive interests” through foreign 
copyright.84  In the court’s view, the authors’ interests “are at least as important or 
substantial as other interests that the Supreme Court has found to be sufficiently 
important or substantial to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.”85 
In deciding whether section 514 “was ‘designed to address a real harm, and 
whether [it] will alleviate [that harm] in a material way,’”86 the Tenth Circuit largely 
deferred to Congress.  The court seems to have been under the impression that 
Congress was able to carefully weigh the implications of section 514 during 
consideration of the URAA.  However, in light of the fact that Congress was not 
permitted to make any changes to the URAA—it was negotiated by the Clinton 
                                                                                                                                                
76 Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at 1–
2, Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009) (No. 1:01-CV-1854).  The reference, 
“Peters,” is to Defendant Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights at the time the case was heard.  
Ms. Peters has since retired and was succeeded by Maria Pallante on June 1, 2011. 
77 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010). 
78 Id. at 1082. 
79 Id. at 1083. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1084. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1084 (alteration in original). 
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Administration and the United States Trade Representative, and Congress was 
forced to accept or reject it as a whole87—the court’s deference was probably 
misplaced in this instance.  The court also probably put too much weight on the fact 
that “Congress heard testimony addressing the interests of American copyright 
holders,”88 failing to properly consider the source of that testimony, namely, the 
Recording Industry Association of America, the International Intellectual Property 
Alliance, and the Motion Picture Association of America—i.e., industry 
representatives, all of whom had a financial interest in passing section 514 despite 
its First Amendment problems.89 
The court ultimately concluded that section 514 does not burden substantially 
more speech than necessary to advance the government’s interest.90  The court first 
reiterated the Supreme Court’s view that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
are sufficient “built-in” First Amendment protections and then concluded that 
because section 514 does nothing to “disturb these traditional, built-in protections,” it 
does not burden a substantial amount of speech that would otherwise be protected by 
the First Amendment.91  The court seems to have forgotten that the question is 
whether the traditional contours of copyright are altered, not whether the Supreme 
Court’s so-called “built-in First Amendment protections” remain in place. 
After determining that section 514 does not burden substantially more speech 
than necessary to advance what is an important government interest and is thus 
narrowly tailored, the court decided that despite the fact that other, less restrictive 
means could have been used to comply with the Berne Convention, Congress was not 
required to choose those less restrictive means.92  In light of these conclusions, the 
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that section 514 violates the First 
Amendment, finding instead that section 514 is “consistent with the First 
Amendment.”93  The court also refused to find section 514 unconstitutional on its 
face, as plaintiffs requested in their cross-appeal.94  With the Tenth Circuit’s 
reversal, the stage was set for an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
III. ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
Following the Tenth Circuit decision, the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 7, 
2011.95  Plaintiffs, now petitioners, filed their merits brief on June 14, 2011,96 and the 
                                                                                                                                                
87 Karp, supra note 23, at 185–86. 
88 Golan, 609 F.3d at 1085. 
89 Id. at 1085–88. 
90 Id. at 1094. 
91 Id. at 1091 n.9. 
92 Id. at 1091–94. 
93 Id. at 1094. 
94 Id. 
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 
2010 WL 4232641. 
96 Brief for the Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 
WL 2423674 [hereinafter Pets. Br.]. 
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government, now respondents, filed its merits brief on August 3, 2011.97  Petitioners 
filed their reply brief on August 31, 2011.98 
Meanwhile, this case attracted the active interest of several organizations in 
favor of both parties.  In addition to two amicus briefs filed in support of the 
certiorari petition,99 sixteen organizations filed amicus briefs in support of petitioners 
and eight organizations filed amicus briefs in support of respondents.  Out of these 
sixteen amicus briefs supporting petitioner, three amici focused their arguments on 
the Copyright Clause violation,100 and six amici focused on the First Amendment 
violation.101  Six amici argued that section 514 violated both the Copyright Clause 
and the First Amendment,102 and one amicus argued that treaties, including the 
URAA, do not expand Congress’s legislative authority.103  The eight remaining 
amicus briefs supported respondents and argued that section 514 was not 
unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment.104 
                                                                                                                                                
97 Brief for the Respondents, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 
2011 WL 3379598 [hereinafter Resps. Br.]. 
98 Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 
2011 WL 4500811 [hereinafter Pets. Reply Br.]. 
99 Brief for Internet Archive as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 
F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2010 WL 4876471; Brief of the Conductors Guild as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2010 
WL 4874473. 
100 Brief of Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, 
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470832, at *2; Brief for Creative Commons 
Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 
2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470826, at *5–6 (June 20, 2011) (No. 10-545); Brief of Pub. Domain 
Interests as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4–6, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470829, at * 4–7. 
101 Brief of Daniel J. Gervais as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Golan v. 
Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470824, *2–3; Brief of Pub. 
Knowledge as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470822, at *2–3; Brief of Info. Soc’y Project at Yale Law as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 
10-545), 2011 WL 2470834, at *2; Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 
2578555, at *5–6; Brief of the Conductors Guild as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, 
Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2010 WL 4874473, at *3; Brief of 
Project Petrucci, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 
1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578554, at *3. 
102 Brief of H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui and Tyler T. Ochoa as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 1–2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470823, 
at *1–2; Brief of Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 4–5, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470821, at *4–5; 
Brief of Heartland Angels, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Golan v. Holder, 
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470833, at *5–6; Brief of Justice and 
Freedom Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 
(10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470825, at *2; Brief of Am. Library Ass’n, et al. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, 28, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-
545), 2011 WL 2533007, at *28; Brief for Google, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
8–9, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533006, at *8–9. 
103 Brief of The Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, 
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2532843, at *2–3. 
104 Brief for the Int’l Publishers Ass’n et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4–
5, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3467247, at *4–5; Brief of 
[11:83 2011] Golan v. Holder:   97 
 Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment 
 
The Supreme Court will address whether section 514 of the URAA violates 
either of two constitutional provisions:  the Copyright Clause or the First 
Amendment.  The petitioners’ brief also addresses the respondents’ previous 
argument that Congress can avoid these constitutional provisions by invoking the 
Commerce Clause or its Treaty Power.105  Respondents do not address this argument 
at length in their brief, but they explain in a footnote that if the Court finds section 
514 to have violated the Copyright Clause, but not the First Amendment, it should 
remand the case to the court of appeals.106  There, the lower court would determine 
whether another enumerated Congressional power could uphold section 514, an issue 
preserved by the government below.107  In their reply brief, petitioners contend that 
respondents did not preserve this issue below, or if they did, that the questions can 
and should be resolved by the Court itself without remand.108 
Focusing on the main issues, this Part elucidates each of the parties’ arguments 
with respect to the Copyright Clause and, primarily, the First Amendment. 
A. Whether Section 514 Violates the Copyright Clause. 
As noted above, on this case’s first appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that section 
514 did not violate the Copyright Clause.109  The next two opinions, by the district 
court and then the Tenth Circuit on the case’s second appeal, focused on the First 
Amendment questions at stake.110  Before the Supreme Court, petitioners again 
argue that section 514 violates the Copyright Clause; the government disagrees.  The 
parties base their arguments on the Clause’s text, the Framers’ intentions, and 
consistent historical practice. 
                                                                                                                                                
the Int’l Coal. for Copyright Prot. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Golan v. Holder, 
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2009 WL 3760476, at *3; Brief of The Am. Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors, and Publishers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Golan v. 
Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561885, at *3; Brief of Intellectual 
Prop. Owners Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 
1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561889, at *2–3; Brief for the Motion Picture Ass’n of 
Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–8 , Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 
2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561888, at *7–8; Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 4–5 , Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 
WL 3561887, at *4–5; Brief of Franklin Pierce Ctr. for Intellectual Prop. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 
3561883, at *2, 5; Brief of Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, , 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545). 
105 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 62. 
106 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 33 n.15. 
107 Id. 
108 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 22–23. 
109 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 57–94 and accompanying text. 
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1. Does the Text of the Copyright Clause Prohibit Removal of Works from the Public 
Domain? 
Petitioners and respondents first squabble over the actual text of the Copyright 
Clause and whether it allows—or prohibits—removal of works from the public 
domain.  As stated by the Court in its most recent seminal copyright case, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft,111 the Constitution defines Congress’s copyright power in its Copyright 
Clause:  “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”112 
Petitioners cite Supreme Court copyright cases that define the public domain 
based on this clause.113  Most importantly for Golan, petitioners cite the Court’s 1966 
patent opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co.114 which states, “Congress may not 
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge 
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”115  
Petitioners conclude from this patent case that in copyright law as well, “[u]pon 
entering the public domain, a work must remain there.”116  Section 514, petitioners 
argue, violates this concept and “evaporated” the public’s right to access these 
materials that had entered the public domain.117  Respondents, on the other hand, 
acknowledge that the Copyright Clause imposes “various constraints” on Congress’s 
authority, but they contend “[s]ection 514 is fully consistent with each of those 
limitations.”118  Respondents cast aside petitioners’ textual restriction as “an 
additional, atextual limitation” created by and for the petitioners.119 
Although the parties use the same definition of “limited [t]imes,”120 they 
disagree on the definition’s implications for section 514.  Quoting Eldred, they both 
define “limited” as having the same meaning at the Framing as it has now:  
“‘confine[d] within certain bounds,’ ‘restrain[ed],’ or ‘circumscribe[d].’”121  According to 
petitioners, “[r]emoving works from the public domain violates the [Copyright 
Clause’s] ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction by turning a fixed and predictable period into 
one that can be reset or resurrected at anytime, even after it expires.”122  When a 
work enters the public domain, petitioners argue that this “entry . . . must mark the 
end of protection, not an intermission.  Otherwise, there is no way for members of the 
public to know if the limit has been reached, and no way to rely on it.”123  Petitioners 
                                                                                                                                                
111 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, (2003). 
112 Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
113 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 21–22 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)). 
114 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
115 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 22 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 23. 
118 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 13–14. 
119 Id. at 14. 
120 See Pets. Br., supra note 97, at 21; Resps. Br., supra note 98, at 15. 
121 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 21 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199); Resps. Br., supra note 97, 
at 14. 
122 Id. at 22. 
123 Id. at 23. 
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conclude that section 514’s removal of works from the public domain “violated the 
plain and sensible meaning of the ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction.”124  Respondents, on 
the other hand, interpret the limitation as prohibiting Congress from granting 
permanent copyrights.125  They find that section 514’s restored copyrights are 
“‘limited’ in the relevant respect” simply because they have expiration dates.126  In 
their reply brief, petitioners call respondents’ expiration-date limit “illusory.”127  
Under this limit, petitioners worry that “there is no way for the public to tell if the 
limit has been reached or rely on it,” and that “nothing stops [the government] from 
reaching back hundreds of years” to remove more works from the public domain.128  
Thus, the two parties thus read the same terms—“limited [t]imes”—to reach two 
opposite results regarding section 514. 
Similarly, the parties disagree on the import of the Copyright Clause’s preamble, 
that “Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”129  Respondents point out that petitioners cite no precedent holding that 
the preamble is “an independent limitation” on Congress’s authority.130  Still, 
petitioners argue that the preamble does limit Congress’s copyright power.131  Based 
on definitions from Framing-era dictionaries, petitioners define “progress” as having 
meant “the advancement of knowledge, as well as its spread,”132 and they define 
“science” as having “referred to knowledge and learning.”133  Thus, they conclude that 
Congress’s copyright legislation must promote “progress,” defined as “the creation 
and spread of knowledge and learning.”134  Rather than encourage this artistic 
innovation, petitioners assert that section 514 “inhibits the spread of existing works, 
reduces the universe of material available to the public for further creation, and 
threatens to destroy the incentive to use even those works that remain 
unprotected.”135 
Respondents disagree, stating that if the preamble is a limitation, then section 
514 promotes international progress as required by “today’s global economy.”136  
Respondents relate petitioners’ argument to the argument rejected in Eldred that 
expansion of copyright law covering existing works serves no incentive purpose 
because the works have already been created.137  Eldred recognized that Congress 
was not required to aim all copyright legislation at incentivizing the creation of new 
works, and that the United States’ international leadership role required 
participation in “give-and-take” negotiations.138  Here, respondents argue that section 
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514 promotes the country’s international leadership efforts in negotiating copyright 
laws, thus promoting its overall progress.139  Petitioners reply that respondents 
merely “insis[t] without explanation that copyright statutes promote ‘progress’ 
whenever they involved ‘“participation” in [the] international system.’”140 
Thus, petitioners make a textual argument that section 514 violates the 
Copyright Clause, but respondents reply that this text does not restrain Congress 
from enacting section 514. 
2. Did the Framers Intend to Create a Permanent and Stable Public Domain from 
Which Works Could Not Be Removed? 
Petitioners next appeal to the originalists on the Court by turning to the 
Framers’ intentions regarding the public domain.141  Petitioners explain that the 
Framers were familiar with the potential perils of English monopolies, the equivalent 
of U.S. copyright and patent law.142  Petitioners conclude from this history that the 
Founders and Framers recognized the importance of spreading knowledge, and that 
they enacted the Copyright Clause to “facilitat[e] the release of . . . works to the 
public”143 in “a stable and permanent public domain.”144 
Respondents do not directly counter petitioners’ originalist argument, but they 
mention the actions of certain Framers in their discussion of Congressional historical 
practice and what they interpret as its support for removal of works from the public 
domain.145 
3. Does Historical Practice Confirm that Congress Cannot Restore Copyrights to 
Public Domain Works? 
History always teaches, although its message may be unclear—and here, each 
party uses Congressional history to bolster its own argument.  In Eldred, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress’s “unbroken” historical practice affirmed its 
authorization to extend copyright terms.146  Petitioners accordingly cite similarly 
“unbroken” Congressional practice of leaving works untouched in the public domain 
as confirmation of Congress’s lack of authorization to copyright public domain 
works.147 Respondents, however, interpret historical practice differently to affirm 
Congress’s power to protect works already in the public domain.148 
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The parties’ first historical disagreement focuses on whether the public domain 
existed in 1790, when Congress enacted the first federal copyright law.149  Petitioners 
explain that without federal copyright law, “the public domain of the United States” 
did not yet exist,150 but respondents assert that the first federal copyright statute 
removed works from the existing public domain of the 1790s.151  As petitioners 
acknowledge, copyright protection varied greatly under state law in 1790, leaving 
many works unprotected—and thus free for the public to exploit—in different 
states.152  Respondents assert that this public freedom placed these works in the 
public domain until Congress’s 1790 act copyrighted many of them.153  Petitioners 
accuse respondents of “tr[ying] to rewrite history by misconstruing the first 
Copyright Act.”154  Citing language in this act, petitioners explain that “the 1790 Act 
explicitly presupposes existing copyrights,” thus not applying to any works that were 
not already under copyright protection.155 
Petitioners assert that over the next two hundred years, Congress did not 
remove works from the public domain in any of its nineteen amendments to the 
Copyright Act.156  Respondents point to several separate, private patent and 
copyright bills, however, that removed individual works from the public domain.157  
Petitioners acknowledge “this trickle of private bills that ended in the nineteenth 
century,”158 but note that they “[e]ach apparently reflected an isolated judgment by 
Congress” and that they do not compare with section 514’s application to potentially 
millions of public domain works.159  Further, petitioners note that the copyright bills 
do not appear to have been challenged in court.160  Respondents concede this point, 
but assert the relevance of the “uniformly favorable judicial rulings” when the 
individual patent bills were challenged.161  Petitioners respond to these patent 
rulings by again citing the Court’s conclusion in Graham that Congress does not have 
plenary power to patent inventions in the public domain.162 
Respondents also cite laws that applied beyond individual copyrights and 
patents.  Congress excused failure to comply with certain formalities for patents in 
1832 and copyrights in 1893, and it authorized copyright protection for foreign works 
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in the public domain during World War I and II in 1919 and 1941.163  The 1919 Act 
allowed reliance parties to retain all rights acquired prior to the Act, and the 1941 
Act permitted continued exploitation of works by reliance parties for one year.164  
Although these statutes do not appear to have been challenged in court, respondents 
derive support from an analogous Supreme Court case, McClurg v. Kingsland,165 
concerning a similar patent statute.166  Petitioners differentiate McClurg167 and 
dismiss these wartime copyright laws because Congress did not premise these Acts 
on its Article I authority, the Acts were never challenged in court, and, at most, the 
Acts were mere exceptions in the “exigency of wartime.”168  Respondents argue that 
these explanations would not excuse Congressional exceptions “if petitioners’ basic 
constitutional theory were correct” that historical precedent determines whether 
Congress can remove works from the public domain.169  Petitioners maintain that 
these unchallenged, constitutionally questionable, wartime acts “merely suggest 
Congress may provide limited relief in the rare case in which it is factually 
impossible for an author or inventor to comply with statutory requirements . . . .”170 
Lastly, respondents dispute that petitioners’ citation of a judicially recognized 
“federal right to ‘copy and use’”171 public domain works is a “constitutional right or a 
restriction on the power of Congress.”172  Rather than containing an affirmative right, 
respondents define public domain works as “contingent on the scope of federal patent 
and copyright statutes” and thus subject to Congressional revision.173  Respondents 
interpret the relevant cases as affirming that courts “should respect the various 
balances struck by Congress in its patent and copyright statutes.”174 
*     *     * 
In all, petitioners conclude that section 514 violates the Copyright Clause’s 
specific limitations by removing works from the public domain.175  Respondents 
instead argue that section 514 is a “rational means of achieving [Congress’s goals]” 
and that it “easily satisfies [the applicable] deferential standard” of review.176 
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B. Whether Section 514 Violates the First Amendment. 
Whereas petitioners’ Copyright Clause argument was not accepted in the lower 
courts, petitioners achieved more success with their First Amendment argument.  As 
noted above, the Tenth Circuit recognized on its first appeal that section 514 altered 
the “traditional contours of copyright” and thus was subject to heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny.177  On remand, the district court held that section 514 
burdened substantially more speech than necessary and thus failed this First 
Amendment review.178  On its second appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit held that 
section 514 was subject to this level of scrutiny, but that it survived the review based 
on the government’s interest in protecting the rights of U.S. authors abroad.179 
Before the Supreme Court, both parties again agree that section 514 is a 
content-neutral statute and that it is subject to intermediate First Amendment 
scrutiny if it burdens speech rights.180  Petitioners argue that section 514 is subject to 
and fails this intermediate scrutiny and that it is substantially overbroad.  
Respondents argue first that section 514 does not trigger heightened First 
Amendment review, and then that if such scrutiny is warranted, section 514 is 
narrowly tailored to further important governmental interests and thus it survives 
this review. 
1. Is Section 514 Subject to First Amendment Scrutiny? 
Petitioners assert that section 514 is subject to First Amendment scrutiny,181 
and respondents argue that heightened First Amendment scrutiny is not 
warranted.182  In Eldred, the Court held that copyright law had “built-in free speech 
safeguards” that generally protect speech interests and remove any need for further 
First Amendment scrutiny unless Congress alters “the traditional contours of 
copyright protection.”183  Petitioners contend that section 514 does alter these 
contours “in a dramatic and unprecedented way.”184  Based on two hundred years of 
consistent historical practice, petitioners contend that Congressional revisions to 
copyright law have traditionally left the public domain intact.185  Section 514 alters 
this historical practice by removing works from the public domain, making copyright 
law “unreliable and unpredictable,” and imposing a “substantial chilling effect” on 
the intended uses of the public domain.186  Thus, petitioners see the altered contours 
as earning heightened First Amendment review. 
Respondents disagree with this premise.  They contend that the Tenth Circuit, 
on its initial appeal, “misread” Eldred to mandate First Amendment scrutiny 
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whenever a copyright statute deviated from “any ‘traditional contou[r]’ or ‘time-
honored tradition’ of copyright protection.”187  Respondents instead read these 
“traditional contours” within Eldred’s greater context, concluding that the relevant 
contours are “best understood” as the historic lines “between an author’s exclusive 
rights” and the public’s rights in a copyrighted work.188  Specifically, the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are of “particular significance.”189  
Section 514, respondents point out, does not alter either of these doctrines, and 
thus—like in Eldred—further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.190 
Regarding copyright law’s “built-in free speech safeguards,” the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, petitioners find them “plainly inadequate” to 
absolve section 514 from First Amendment scrutiny.191  Prior to section 514, 
petitioners and the public “had the unrestricted right to perform, copy, teach and 
distribute the entire work, for any reason.”192  Whereas the idea/expression dichotomy 
and fair use doctrine permit certain types of restricted access to the works, “[p]laying 
a few bars of a Shostakovich symphony is no substitute for performing the entire 
work.”193  Petitioners explain that Eldred did not state or even suggest that there 
were only two applicable safeguards.194  Further, petitioners argue that irrevocable 
entry into the public domain was not relevant to the facts in Eldred, and that the 
public domain actually has more historic and Framing-era significance than either of 
Eldred’s two safeguards.195  Thus, because leaving the public domain intact is “a 
defining feature” and “an essential safeguard” of copyright law, petitioners assert 
that heightened First Amendment scrutiny must be applied.196 
To disprove respondents’ analogy of Golan to Eldred, and its attendant result, 
petitioners differentiate the speech interests at stake in each case.197  On the one 
hand, in Eldred, the affected works had never entered the public domain, so the 
Court identified the speech interests as “no more than the right to make ‘other 
people’s speeches.’”198  Under section 514, on the other hand, petitioners assert “the 
right to make the speeches that belonged to them and to the American public . . . .”199  
Petitioners further cite case law to assert that First Amendment rights “do not 
become less important” when they involve another’s expression.200 
Respondents disagree, stating that the “practical effect” of the challenged 
statutes in both Eldred and Golan “is to limit, for finite temporal periods, the use of a 
defined category of works of authorship that would have been subject to unrestricted 
public exploitation” without the statutes.201  Unlike petitioners, respondents do not 
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find meaningful the distinction that section 514 removes works that already rested in 
the public domain.202  Petitioners contend that these interests are “vested and 
established public speech rights,”203 but respondents note that section 514 avoids 
imposing retroactive liability, and that petitioners cite no case law supporting a 
“vested” right to prevent a restriction that otherwise survives First Amendment 
scrutiny.204 
Further, respondents state that petitioners’ claimed harm of diminishment of 
investment value is not a sufficient economic effect to constitute a constitutional 
violation.205  Even if section 514 disappointed petitioners investment-backed 
expectations, respondents argue that no Supreme Court precedent “suggest[s] that 
[this] disappointment . . . can raise First Amendment concerns simply because the 
relevant investments pertain to expressive activities.”206  Respondents explain that 
this economic diminishment would “more naturally” premise a claim under the Due 
Process clause—abandoned by the petitioners in the lower court—or the Just 
Compensation Clause—not asserted by petitioners.207  In a footnote, respondents 
recognize that copyright laws that violate “some independent First Amendment 
prohibition”—such as those premised on an author’s viewpoint—would raise 
“[d]ifferent constitutional issues.”208  Respondents also acknowledge that “the 
restrictions traditionally associated with copyright law could not constitutionally be 
imposed on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis.”209  But respondents assert that 
“nothing of that sort is at issue here.”210 
Respondents also argue that, on its first appeal, the Tenth Circuit “misread the 
historical record” to find that section 514 was not consistent with the “traditional 
contours” of copyright law.211  Respondents warn that this reading places “a broad 
range” of previous copyright law revisions under heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny each time Congress departed from prior copyright practice, including the 
extensions of protection to sound recordings and architectural works.212  Respondents 
also caution that this interpretation would “substantially undermin[e]” judicial 
deference to Congress on copyright legislation.213  Nevertheless, respondents refer to 
their earlier historical analysis214 to state that section 514 is consistent with the 
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“frequen[t]” Congressional practice of removing works from the public domain, 
beginning with its first copyright law in 1790.215 
Lastly, respondents describe the applicability of “[t]he same two First 
Amendment ‘supplements’ on which the Court relied in Eldred.”216  These 
‘supplements’ established that copyright law exemptions apply to certain uses of 
copyrighted works by institutions such as libraries and small businesses.217  
Respondents point to the URAA’s “additional accommodation,” such as its provisions 
for reliance parties.218  Respondents mention that copyright holders sent “fewer than 
50,000” notices of their intent to enforce, and that reliance parties who did not 
receive notices may continue exploitation of the works.219  Respondents’ statistic 
counts only notices sent to the Copyright Office, and ignores the potentially millions 
of notices that were or will be sent directly to reliance parties, as the URAA 
permits.220 
Thus, petitioners agree with the lower Golan opinions that intermediate 
scrutiny should apply to section 514, whereas respondents argue that this heightened 
level of scrutiny should not apply. 
2. Does Section 514 Survive Heightened First Amendment Scrutiny? 
Petitioners explain that section 514 fails heightened First Amendment scrutiny, 
and thus that section 514 violates the First Amendment.  Respondents, however, 
assert three potential justifications for section 514:  Berne Convention compliance, 
promoting U.S. authors abroad, and remedying prior inequities for foreign authors.  
This Part examines each of the respondents’ justifications in turn, coupled with the 
petitioners’ arguments against them. 
a. Does the Government’s Interest in Complying with the Berne Convention Justify 
Section 514? 
The parties first dispute whether the government’s interest in complying with 
the Berne Convention justifies section 514.  Petitioners argue that the government 
cannot justify section 514 based on its interest incompliance with the Berne 
Convention,221 but respondents assert that section 514 is narrowly tailored to achieve 
this goal.222  Petitioners argue that the government did not assert the “substantial 
evidence of real harm” from apparent noncompliance required to justify its burden on 
speech.223  Before enacting section 514, the United States had already secured 
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protection for its authors by joining the Berne Convention.224  In 1988, Congress 
concluded that it did not need to remove works from the public domain to comply 
with the Berne Convention, and that the United States was in compliance with the 
Berne Convention.225 
Respondents claim that, in 1994, “Congress and the Executive Branch revisited 
implementation of Article 18, and Congress enacted [s]ection 514 of the URAA.”226  
Petitioners dispute this fact, explaining that “[t]he URAA was drafted by the [U.S. 
Trade Representative] and sent to Congress under a fast track procedure that 
precluded amendment.”227  The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
confirmed that “restoration was discretionary,”228 and “Congress did not revisit any of 
the findings it made in 1988,” or make any findings that the Berne Convention or 
TRIPS compliance required enactment of section 514.229  If the lack of restoration did 
cause any noncompliance, “the only apparent consequence” was that a few Berne 
Convention member countries, such as Thailand and Russia, “had apparently 
declined to restore copyright protection to U.S. works” in their public domains.230  
According to the petitioners, any U.S. interest in “creating economic windfalls” for 
American authors in these few countries is not a legitimate, or important enough, 
interest to justify section 514’s burden on speech.231 
Responding to this argument, respondents first state that the Berne 
Convention’s restoration requirements are not in dispute in that they technically 
require restoration of foreign works.232  The government may have an important 
interest, they argue, in avoiding harms such as not experiencing the “full benefits” of 
Berne Convention membership unless its “international partners” recognize U.S. 
compliance,233 maintaining the United States’ “international credibility,” and 
reducing the chance that other countries would challenge its Article 18 
implementation under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and with potential 
trade sanctions.234  Respondents cite the Executive Branch’s advice to Congress that 
a WTO challenge was “likely.”235  Petitioners question the importance of avoiding 
WTO challenges, considering that the United States has lost at least thirty-seven of 
its 128 or more formal disputes before the WTO, and that it has done nothing in 
response to a ten-year-old WTO ruling that another U.S. copyright law violates 
TRIPS.236 
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If respondents are correct that the United States was not in compliance with the 
Berne Convention, petitioners argue that section 514 is still not narrowly tailored to 
the goal of compliance because it could have burdened “substantially less speech” 
while achieving compliance.237  Petitioners describe the government’s three 
potentially less-restrictive means in turn:  special negotiations, more protection for 
reliance parties, or allowing application of the rule of the shorter term or first sale 
rights. 
First, petitioners argue that the United States could have achieved full 
compliance by negotiating the “special conventions” permitted by the Berne 
Convention to modify its restoration provisions.238  Under these conventions, the 
United States could have negotiated the modification or elimination of restoration 
provisions “to accommodate the unique position of the United States relative to any 
other Berne Convention signatory” based on the United States Constitution and the 
size and scope of the U.S. public domain.239  Respondents, however, doubt the 
practicality and success of entering into “extremely arduous” negotiations with “each 
of the more than 160 Berne Convention or WTO members.”240  Further, respondents 
argue that these negotiations would have conflicted with the government’s interests 
in U.S. authors abroad and in the equitable treatment of foreign authors.241 
Second, petitioners argue that section 514’s “weak and temporary protection for 
reliance parties” was not narrowly tailored to an interest in Berne Convention 
compliance.242  The Berne Convention gave parties “broad discretion” to determine 
protection for reliance parties, and petitioners explain that “[t]here is nothing in its 
text that prohibits reliance interests from being protected completely and 
permanently,” or from receiving “permanent freedom to do as they wish with any 
copy or recording that was lawfully made prior to section 514.”243  In fact, the district 
court on remand had invalidated section 514 because “the government could have 
provided complete and permanent protection for reliance parties like petitioners 
under the express terms of the Berne Convention.”244  Respondents disagree, 
contending that this “full and permanent” protection would not have achieved “actual 
and perceived compliance with the Berne Convention,” and that it may have been 
challenged in a WTO proceeding.245  This risk was too high, respondents explain, and 
the United States has a “substantial interest in avoiding the appearance of an 
international-law violation” that could affect its international credibility and status 
as a “trusted partner.”246 
Third, petitioners contend that the United States could have provided shorter 
protection terms or more protection for existing copies of restored works.247  First, 
under the Berne Convention’s rule of the shorter term, the United States could have 
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restored protection for foreign works only until their terms expired in their countries 
of origin.248  Instead, section 514 restores these works to the full term of U.S. 
protection, often “result[ing] in years of unnecessary protection . . . .”249  Additionally, 
the Berne Convention would have allowed the United States to protect first sale 
rights.250  For over a century, the United States has recognized first sale rights, 
“generally permit[ting] the owner of any lawfully made copy to sell or otherwise 
dispose of that copy without the permission of the copyright owner.”251  section 514 
does not allow first sale rights beyond a one-year grace period, thus burdening rights 
more than required for compliance with the Berne Convention.252 
Because these arguments were not raised below, respondents ask the Court not 
to consider the rule of the shorter term or first sale rights.253  Petitioners argue 
against this waiver because they have maintained a consistent argument against 
narrow tailoring throughout the litigation, and “in any event” the burden of proving 
narrow tailoring is on respondents.254  Respondents further argue that once the Court 
establishes Congress’s authority to restore these copyrights, the “appropriate period 
of protection is subject only to rational-basis review.”255  They further state that 
petitioners’ entire “less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of 
the inquiry into the validity of content-neutral regulations on speech.”256 
In all, respondents present Berne Comvention compliance as a sufficient 
governmental interest to justify section 514’s restriction on speech.  Petitioners 
disagree, arguing that respondents did not assert enough evidence of harm to make 
this a legitimate government interest.  Petitioners further point to three less-
restrictive alternatives that the government could have pursued, but respondents 
dispute both the alternatives and their relevance. 
b. Does the Government’s Interest in Promoting the Rights of United States Authors 
Abroad Justify Section 514? 
The parties next dispute whether the government’s interest in promoting the 
rights of U.S. authors abroad justifies section 514’s restriction on speech.  The Tenth 
Circuit addressed only this interest on appeal, and found it to be a valid justification 
of section 514.  Petitioners contend that the United States does not have an 
important—or “even a legitimate”—interest in promoting the rights of U.S. authors 
abroad.257  In petitioners’ view, Congress “g[ave] away vested public speech rights on 
the bare possibility that it might someday create private economic benefits for U.S. 
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authors.”258  Respondents object to petitioners’ portrayal of this protection as 
“windfalls,” instead defining it as “a (belated) opportunity to receive a reasonable 
return on their creative investment.”259  In fact, respondents accuse petitioners and 
other reliance parties of receiving a “windfall” in their pre-URAA exploitation of 
foreign works by Russian composers who were never compensated for these uses 
within the United States.260  Respondents assert that the government’s interest in 
these authors is part of copyright law’s recognized purpose of “[r]ewarding authors 
for their creative labor.”261  Accordingly, section 514 creates economic incentives for 
foreign authors, whose works benefit Americans, and for American authors, who 
require “effective protections abroad” in “today’s global economy.”262 
Petitioners dispute the certainty of any benefit to U.S. authors, arguing that 
Congress had only “guesses” and “a general hope that a few foreign nations may one 
day provide reciprocal protection . . . .”263  Petitioners contend that this “abstract and 
unsubstantiated hope” does not provide the required “substantial evidence” for 
Congress’s predictive judgment.264  Respondents, however, contend that Congress 
had “clear, substantial evidence” that the foreign restoration of U.S. works was 
“directly tied” to the U.S. government’s own restoration of foreign works.265  This 
prediction, respondents argue, “proved correct” when Russia restored copyrights for 
U.S. authors sometime after section 514 was enacted.266  Petitioner asserts that 
respondents can point out “exactly one country (Russia)” and that its reciprocal 
restoration “did not happen until 2004.”267  Interestingly enough, this occurred three 
years after Golan filed suit,268 and ten years after the URAA’s enactment.269  
Respondents further state that this foreign demand for reciprocity included “the 
scope and extent” of restored rights.270  Respondents explain that Congress’s 
“predictions accord with common sense,” and that “Congress has broad latitude to 
make such predictive judgments, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs . . . .”271  
Petitioners maintain that “the government . . . does not attempt to explain why it has 
any proper interest in giving away public speech rights to create private economic 
benefits.”272  Thus, the parties dispute whether section 514 promotes U.S. authors’ 
rights, and whether any such promotion justifies section 514. 
                                                                                                                                                
258 Id. at 49–50. 
259 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 49. 
260 Id. at 50. 
261 Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)). 
262 Id. 
263 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 50. 
264 Id. at 51. 
265 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 51. 
266 Id. 
267 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 20–21. 
268 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
270 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 52. 
271 Id. at 53. 
272 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 21. 
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c. Does the Government’s Interest in Remedying Prior Inequalities of Treatment of 
Foreign Authors Justify Section 514? 
Lastly, respondents contend that section 514 furthers the government’s 
important interest in “remedying prior inequalities of treatment between American 
and foreign authors.”273  Certain works had entered the public domain because their 
foreign authors did not comply with copyright formalities that did not exist in their 
countries, and that Congress later repealed.274  Respondents explain that section 514 
“alleviate[s] those prior disparities.”275  Petitioners contend that section 514 instead 
“creates inequity where none existed” because U.S. authors who similarly failed to 
comply with formalities during this time do not receive restoration under section 
514.276  The parties thus disagree on whether the United States has a valid remedial 
interest which justifies section 514. 
*     *     * 
In their briefs before the Court, the parties differ sharply in their interpretations 
of constitutional text, Congressional history and practice, international obligations, 
and governmental interests.  They ultimately argue for and against the 
constitutionality of section 514 under both the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment. 
IV. GOLAN IN THE COURT:  AN APPRAISAL OF THE ISSUES 
As we have seen, the Court might plausibly consider four issues in Golan.277  
Does restoration of copyright in works that have been in the public domain violate 
the Copyright Clause?  Assuming that to be so as a general proposition, is the specific 
restoration of foreign works (as allowed by section 514 of the URAA) permitted 
nevertheless?  Does the Treaty Power additionally or separately enable Congress to 
authorize such restoration?  And finally, does the restoration in this case violate the 
First Amendment, whether in the particular circumstances occasioned by the URAA 
or more generally? 
We will comment on the first three issues only briefly, mainly in order to 
anticipate our somewhat longer comment on the fourth.  What the Court ultimately 
may do with any of these issues is an open question as we write, of course, but at 
least in our judgment there is no doubt that the role of the First Amendment ought to 
be seen as paramount among them.  To put the matter bluntly, the Court’s previous 
cases have dealt with the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment 
in a cavalier and barely coherent fashion. Copyright has been given primacy of place 
between them, while the First Amendment has been treated as if it were an 
inconvenient subject of merely secondary concern.  Golan affords an opportunity to do 
a better job of reordering that relationship, against a background of more thoughtful 
                                                                                                                                                
273 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 54. 
274 Id. at 53–54. 
275 Id. at 54. 
276 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 22. 
277 See infra Part IV.C.  We are restating and reordering the issues somewhat in this portion of 
our essay, but without intending to affect them in substantive terms.  As we will explain, the role of 
the Treaty Power does not actually appear to be at issue in the case. 
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and persuasive reasoning.  With others who are following the case closely, we can 
hope that the Court will prove itself equal to that challenge. 
 
But first things first. 
A. The General Inviolability of the Public Domain 
It seems unlikely that Congress can authorize a general restoration of copyright 
in works in which protection has vested and then run to its conclusion in due course.  
Copyright in the United States has long been thought to presuppose limited terms 
followed by permanent repose in the public domain as part of an essential bargain 
envisioned by the Framers and reflected in the Copyright Clause.  Original works of 
authorship are given limited terms of protection in order “to promote the progress of 
science,” a phrase in which “science” is taken to mean human knowledge and 
understanding, rather than technical know-how.278  Copyright is justified as an 
incentive to produce such works; the public domain is the place to which every work 
of authorship must eventually be consigned in order to fulfill the terms of the 
bargain.279  Congress generally has no power to set aside this bargain under that 
Clause.280 
To be sure, no case confirms this proposition in quite such unequivocal terms.281  
But it has long been an article of faith, one amounting to common ground, among 
serious students of copyright.  The oral argument in Eldred proceeded against what 
appeared to be a general concession to this effect from all quarters, including 
members of the Court who found occasion to address the proposition in passing, and 
whose comments left no reason to suppose they doubted it.282  Still other recent cases 
                                                                                                                                                
278 See Sen. Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, To Promote the Progress of Science:  The 
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2002) 
(explaining that the notion of “science” during copyright’s founding era generally meant all forms of 
learning and knowledge) (citing THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 1789)). 
279 See James H. Billington, Copyright, Electronic Works, And Federal Libraries:  Maintaining 
Equilibrium, FED. LIBR. & INFO. CTR. COMM. (Mar. 10, 1999) available at 
http://www.loc.gov/flicc/forum99.html; see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 
965, 1023 (1990) (noting that the public domain contains “raw material” for the use of other 
authors). 
280 See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE:  A 
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  265-66 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2002). 
281 But cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (explaining that “Congress may not 
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available”).  Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the 
Constitution, which was the subject of the Court’s observation in Graham, applies to copyright as 
well as patent law.  There is no defensible reason to suppose that the public domain is or should be 
less secure in copyright than in patent law.  Indeed, if there is any difference between them 
historically, then, as we will point out presently, the exact opposite is to be expected.  See infra notes 
333–335 and accompanying text. 
282 The question of restoration of works in the public domain after an expired term was not 
before the Court in Eldred, but it was addressed briefly and hypothetically during oral argument. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, at 21–22, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (No.01-0618).  The 
government sought to leave the question open, but ultimately appeared to concede that there was a 
“bright line” between term extensions and restoration from the public domain.  Id. at 29–30, 44.  The 
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have treated the passage of works into the public domain as an all-but-inviolable 
assurance of their availability to anyone who may care to make use of them.283  
Nothing in Golan is really at odds with a general proposition that works in the public 
domain are ordinarily beyond the protection of copyright under a conventional 
understanding of the Copyright Clause.  We think it likely that the Court will concur 
in this essential understanding. 
B. Restoration of Public Domain Works under the URAA and the Copyright Clause 
It does not necessarily follow from the general inviolability of the public domain 
that the “restoration” to copyright protection of works like those covered by section 
514 is forbidden by the Copyright Clause.  To be sure, such restoration cannot be said 
to be included among the powers granted to Congress in any explicit sense.  It is 
doubtful the Framers themselves would have expected it.  There is nothing even 
remotely conventional about it:  restoration of this sort falls well outside the 
“traditional contours” of copyright.  And yet Congress surely is not to be seen as 
enmeshed forever in the uses of the past, no more so in the context of copyright than 
in some other setting altogether.  Article I of the Constitution imposes any number of 
limits on Congressional action, including limits on the general restoration to 
protection of public domain works; but whether the Copyright Clause limits the 
action taken in the context of restoration under the URAA remains a more subtle 
question. 
Restoration in these very particular circumstances might be seen (more or less 
as the government has argued) as an essentially procedural step taken to limit the 
untoward or inequitable effects of erstwhile formal requirements now judged to have 
been unnecessary or unjustified as applied to a limited class of works.  Whether that 
is so is debatable.  But the petitioners are surely right to argue in response that one 
historic pattern of legislative unfairness does not justify another one now.  The new 
Act might have been tailored in a different way, particularly so as to exempt 
“reliance parties” from its detrimental strictures.  Reliance parties might have been 
given the right, for example, to continue to exploit these works in such fashion as 
they had already undertaken to do, essentially as the creators of derivative works are 
                                                                                                                                                
Justices who entertained hypotheticals involving restoration (Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter) 
did not suggest that they thought such action would be constitutional.  Id. at 38.  The petitioners 
stated early on that work could not be withdrawn from the public domain after the expiration of an 
applicable term, even if the term might be extended while the copyright still subsisted.  Id. at 43–48.  
The Court’s eventual opinion appeared to reflect this understanding.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 234 (2002) (“The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the 
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose . . . Congress may not authorize the issuance 
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available.”) (quoting Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
283 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (explaining that once a 
patentee or copyright holder’s monopoly has expired, the public has the right to use the work at will 
without attribution to the original creator). 
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given the right to continue the exploitation of their works after the exercise of 
termination rights.284  
We do not presume to rewrite the Act.  Nor do we mean to endorse restoration 
even in less objectionable circumstances.  We intend merely to acknowledge in 
passing the greater resulting plausibility of an argument in support of such 
restoration, as against the countervailing weight of the Copyright Clause, were 
restoration to be carefully tailored so as to work at least no immediate harm to 
persons who had acted in reliance on the public domain.  The important point here is 
that Congress could have provided for restoration, well within the requirements of 
the Berne Convention, without necessarily having substituted one form of inequity 
for another.  It might well have done so, but it did not clearly do so. 
Given the uncertain consequences of restoration as it is actually configured in 
the legislation, the result seems plainly at odds with the essential purpose and 
function of the public domain.285  As the Court itself has acknowledged in at least two 
recent cases, the public domain is meant to enable secure reliance on the availability 
of the works residing there for such uses as those who encounter them may choose to 
make.286  The petitioners could not sensibly have been expected to suppose otherwise.  
They have obviously been harmed by the legislation that figures in this case:  the 
licensing scheme woven into the URAA legislation does not secure them against the 
threat of ruinous expenses and transaction costs.287  In these circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                
284 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(a)(4)(A) (2006); see also notes 22–32, 236–255 and 
accompanying text, which addresses the following observations.  As to the essential terms and 
conditions of continuing exploitation, proprietors of post-termination derivative works remain in the 
position they were in prior to termination.  In contrast, proprietors of post-restoration derivative 
works arguably must negotiate new license fees or else face litigation in a federal court into whose 
judgment the question of a “reasonable” fee is consigned.  The effect is to throw reliance parties into 
a position of uncertainty as to the viability of continued exploitation of derivative works under the 
URAA; see Email from Eric Schwartz, Attorney at Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp L.L.P., and Acting 
General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office at the time of the drafting of the URAA, to author, 
Oct. 3, 2011 (on file with author) (noting that the then-Acting Copyright Register herself drafted the 
reliance party exceptions).  The exceptions:  (a) included the certain and unambiguous right of the 
user to continue to exploit the derivative work for the remainder of copyright after restoration, 
pursuant to section 104A(d)(3), subject only to (b) a “reasonable” compensation, which might be in 
some instances de minimis (i.e., $1).  Id.; see Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on 
Retroactive United States Copyright Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 157, 241 (discussing the limited requirements of the Berne Convention, and the numerous 
ways in which Congress might have secured reliance parties against the adverse effects of 
restoration). 
285 No party to the case disputes that petitioners will be harmed.  The Tenth Circuit accepted it 
as a given that some restriction on the petitioners’ rights would follow from the legislative scheme 
enacted pursuant to the URAA.  See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 2010). 
286 See, e.g., TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (stating “[t]rade dress protection must subsist with the 
recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products”); see 
also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 24 (explaining that Dastar took a creative work that was within the public 
domain, copied it, made a few minor changes, and then produced its own set of videotapes based on 
the original). 
287 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  The legislation enables restoration 
proprietors to demand fees for licenses without any explicit limit on those demands.  If agreement is 
not reached as to the amount of a disputed fee, then the matter is remitted to the jurisdiction of a 
federal court for a decision as to a “reasonable” amount, with litigation likely to follow. 
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restoration appears to be deeply and fundamentally at odds with both the purpose of 
the public domain and of the Copyright Clause itself.288 
C. The Role of the Treaty Power 
The petitioners in Golan plainly anticipated reliance by the government on the 
Treaty Power conferred on Congress under Article I, and briefed the issue 
accordingly.289  As we have said in our summary of the parties’ positions, however, 
the government has not addressed the issue at length, and in fact has asked that any 
ruling on this issue take place in a lower court.290  We can expect that the Court will 
not take up the question either.  Though the matter now appears to be less pressing, 
we think it still deserves some passing attention in our comments. 
Does the Treaty Clause authorize Congress to do what the Copyright Clause 
does not?  Or to sharpen the question, can Congress rely on its Treaty Power to act 
against an affirmative constraint implicit in the Copyright Clause?  To this latter 
inquiry we think the answer must be, decisively, No. 
Again, no case in the Supreme Court has addressed this question directly.  In 
The Trade-Mark Cases291 in 1879 the Court did reserve its opinion as to whether the 
Treaty Power might serve as a source of jurisdiction in enacting trademark 
legislation that the Copyright Clause did not support.292  But the Copyright Clause 
did not affirmatively forbid trademark legislation; it merely established certain 
prerequisites to enactment (namely, originality) that trademark law did not meet.293  
Trademark law itself was not seen as conflicting with copyright in any inherent or 
fundamental way.  Indeed, had the Commerce Clause otherwise been available, the 
Court appeared to suppose (without actually deciding) that the two systems of law 
(copyright and trademark) might have proceeded on separate jurisdictional 
grounds.294 
In the event, the Commerce Clause was not available under the restricted 
interpretation that governed it in the late nineteenth century. Meanwhile, no treaty 
was involved in The Trademark Cases at all.  The Court appeared merely to happen 
upon the Treaty Clause as it rummaged among the provisions of the Constitution for 
other suitable sources of jurisdiction.  In the end, then, the Court went no further 
than to acknowledge the unexamined possibility of alternative sources of jurisdiction 
under multiple clauses in a case involving no direct conflict arising from one clause 
as against another.  There is nothing at all remarkable in that scenario.  Today, the 
                                                                                                                                                
288 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, advancement, and things 
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system . . . .  This is 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”). 
289 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 62. 
290 Supra notes 100–108 and accompanying text. 
291 In re The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
292 Id. at 99. 
293 Id. at 93–94. 
294 See id. at 95 (“The question, therefore, whether the trade-mark bears such a relation to 
commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control, when used or applied to the 
classes of commerce which fall within that control, is one which, in the present case, we propose to 
leave undecided.”). 
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Commerce Clause is given an expanded reading that generally accommodates 
trademark law, ordinarily without conflicting with the Copyright Clause at all.295  
The Treaty Power meanwhile has remained essentially unexamined in this context.  
In a case like Golan, however, the circumstances might be thought to present 
just such a conflict.  As we have seen, the URAA provisions reflected in sections 514 
affront the Copyright Clause in a fundamental way by limiting secure reliance on the 
public domain.  But the Treaty Power does not justify this affront explicitly, and 
cannot sensibly be said to do so by implication.  As a preliminary matter, we should 
remember that general provisions in law ordinarily are not to be given precedence 
over more specific limitations.  This is as true in constitutional interpretation as it is 
in other settings.296  It is especially so when Congress has not been thrust upon the 
horns of a dilemma—as it has not been in this case. 
Again, the Berne Convention did not oblige Congress to enact the URAA with its 
attendant strictures upon the legitimate expectations of reliance parties vis-à-vis the 
public domain, and its resulting conflict with the Copyright Clause.  No treaty 
obligation lurked in the background of this affair.  The Berne Convention imposed no 
particular obligation to act one way or another.  This was entirely a matter of 
overreaching and misjudgment on the part of Congress, urged on by the Executive 
Branch.  It would amount to a notable species of chutzpah to defend it now by 
turning to the Treaty Power for authority to do what the Copyright Clause forbids.  
In the end there is no greater reason to rely on the Treaty Power in a case like Golan 
than there was in The Trademark Cases.  In our judgment, the government was quite 
correct to make no issue of the matter here. 
D. Summing-Up, Ad Interim 
Neither the Copyright Clause nor the Treaty Power can sensibly be said to 
justify the scheme adopted by Congress for restoring copyright to foreign works that 
had previously entered the public domain.   
Congress itself has not generally thought it has the power to restore public 
domain works to copyright protection.  The restoration of foreign works provided for 
by the URAA cannot be defended as an exercise in fairness for foreign proprietors, 
given the plainly unfair consequences for reliance parties who may now face hardship 
and even ruin as the public domain status they counted on is swept away.  Whether 
generally or in more particular circumstances, Congress cannot strip works in the 
public domain of their status in violation of the assurance of availability that status 
is meant by the Copyright Clause to secure. 
                                                                                                                                                
295 In both TrafFix and Dastar, for example, no question was raised as to the general authority 
of Congress to enact trademark legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  That authority have 
been acknowledged at least since the enactment of The Lanham Act of 1946.  See generally, David L. 
Lange, The Lanham Act After Fifty Years, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–3 (1996) (prefacing the 
historical evolution of trademark law as noted in a symposium by leading authorities on the 
subject). 
296 See David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law:  An 
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 224–29 (1996). 
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The Treaty Power does not confer the authority to do what Congress has done in 
this case either.  No treaty obligation is involved in Golan, and certainly none that 
requires or justifies the results envisioned by the URAA.  Reliance on the Treaty 
Power would have been a red herring, and nothing more. 
What remains meanwhile is the question—or, really, the array of questions 
occasioned by the role of the First Amendment vis-à-vis copyright.  These were the 
questions that the Tenth Circuit quite rightly recognized in this setting two years 
ago.  That Circuit’s ultimate decision in the case was misjudged, or so we think, but 
the issues themselves remain alive and well.  We turn to them now in the final 
portion of our comments. 
V. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
How should we understand the relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment?  No case before the Court has considered this question in a serious, 
measured, contemplative or plenary fashion.  Thus the pleadings, lower court 
opinions and briefs in Golan to this date all reflect responses that are in their nature 
tentative and inadequate, and often at odds with the real nature of the controversy.  
We will acknowledge these responses, but in our observations here we will also 
advance an understanding of the subject that we think offers a better appreciation of 
the absolute primacy of the Amendment in its on-going relationship with 
copyright.297 
A. Twice-Told Tales298 
No one who knows copyright doubts seriously that it abridges expression.  Its 
very purpose is to abridge some expression in order to encourage other expression, all 
according to an elaborate system of exclusive rights and limitations established by 
Congress.  Copyright may or may not offer important incentives to the expression it 
protects.  Proponents say it does; skeptics question whether that is so.  It does so in 
any event, if it does so at all, by abridging expression that it judges inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                                                
297 Much of the discussion acknowledges and reflects an understanding of the appropriate 
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment developed by Professors David Lange and 
Jefferson Powell in their recent book, No Law: Intellectual Property in the Image of an Absolute First 
Amendment.  See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (Stanford University Press 2009).  This work is 
extensively researched; we count on our readers to avail themselves of that research.  We assume 
readers will also understand that Professor Lange is among the co-authors of both the book and this 
essay.  (Professor Powell, who is currently on leave from the George Washington University School 
of Law to serve in a senior position on the staff of the Department of Justice, has played no role in 
the development of this essay). 
298 The origins of the Court’s current approach to copyright and the First Amendment has been 
recounted numerous times.  See, e.g., LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 108–46.  Much of the 
treatment in their work acknowledges and reflects a conventional understanding of the subject, 
often amounting to common ground.  Their ultimate approach to the subject, however, is 
considerably less conventional. 
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the incentives, such as they may be.  That is the nature of copyright.  Judging and 
abridging expression are among its central functions. 
The government emphatically agrees with us as to this critically important 
point: 
The Copyright Clause differs from other Article I provisions . . . in that the 
very purpose of copyright protection is to limit the manner in which 
expressive works may be used.  The imposition of some restrictions on 
expressive activity is therefore the intended and inherent effect of every 
grant of copyright.299 
Surely, then, copyright must inevitably contravene the First Amendment in an 
important and inescapable way.  How could that not be so? 
Some forty years ago Professor Melville Nimmer published an essay in which he 
himself asked whether, for this very reason, copyright must also therefore violate the 
First Amendment.300  A distinguished scholar of both copyright and the First 
Amendment, Nimmer seemed superbly suited to the inquiry he proposed.  The 
Amendment says, among other things, that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging freedom of speech, or of the press.”301  Surely, he reasoned in a 
powerful introduction to his essay, a system like copyright must be at odds with the 
meaning plainly evident in this language.  Taking the language at face value, as he 
understood Justice Black would do, Nimmer argued that the Amendment is clearly 
inconsistent with the exclusive rights in expression that copyright allows.302  Indeed, 
or so one might easily imagine upon still further reflection, the more important the 
reasons for granting exclusive rights in expression may be, the more important the 
violation of the First Amendment’s absolute proscription also must become. 
In fact, however, Nimmer’s introduction was a cunning exercise in devil’s 
advocacy.  Justice Black’s absolutism (“no law means no law, and no ifs, ands, buts or 
whereases”)303 had been dismissed by nearly everyone with a professional interest in 
the First Amendment, including every member of the Court except Justice Douglas.  
Nimmer himself did not accept the language of the Amendment as an absolute.  
Instead, like many other students of the Amendment then and now, he counted 
himself a disciple of an approach that sought to determine meaning and primacy by 
balancing supposed First Amendment interests against the interests to be served by 
abridgement.  This approach was not limited to copyright; any effort at abridgement 
might be tested in similar fashion.  Indeed, “definitional balancing,” as this approach 
was then known and practiced, was simply a descendant of a more general approach 
to interpreting the constitution at large that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had 
advocated years before.304  Among lawyers, legal scholars and judges, constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                
299 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 34 (emphasis in original). 
300 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free 
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1181 (1970); see generally LANGE & POWELL, supra note 
297, at 134–38. 
301 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
302 See Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1181–83. 
303 Id. at 1811 (quoting Justice Black); see LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 239–60. 
304 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 225–238. 
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absolutes are generally frowned upon in conceptual terms and routinely disfavored in 
practice.305 
Nimmer considered himself free, then, to answer his original question by 
concluding, on balance, that copyright did not ordinarily violate the First 
Amendment.  Some instances of copyrightable expression might be sufficiently 
impressed with public significance to justify First Amendment protection against 
exclusivity:  news of the My Lai massacre, then still a relatively fresh matter of 
public interest and concern, would have qualified in his opinion, as would some other 
subjects.306  But generally it was copyright that would prevail, thanks to doctrinal 
“safeguards” (as they have come to be called) that served to offset First Amendment 
concerns.  In particular, he thought, copyright’s so-called “idea/expression 
dichotomy”—according to which ideas themselves are never copyrightable—meant 
that exclusive rights in expression could be tolerated.307  It is also probable that 
Nimmer would have counted the fair use doctrine as a safeguard, though in fact his 
discussion of that doctrine was actually somewhat ambivalent as to that point.308 
Nimmer’s general conclusion as to copyright’s primacy has survived, augmented 
by two decisions in the Supreme Court that have actually appeared to strengthen 
copyright’s considerable immunity to First Amendment scrutiny.  In Harper & Row 
v. The Nation Magazine,309 decided in 1985, the Court considered a case in which the 
defendants (a minor journal of political commentary and its publisher) had purloined 
and published excerpts from a copyrighted biography of former President Gerald 
Ford which was scheduled to be published later by Harper & Row, accompanied by 
exclusive excerpts to appear in Time Magazine.  Harper & Row claimed damages for 
copyright violation, while The Nation argued that the First Amendment privileged 
the publication—as indeed Nimmer himself might imaginably have argued in the 
circumstances.310 
But Justice O’Connor and the majority rejected the First Amendment defense to 
the copyright claim.311  In her opinion she embraced Nimmer’s reasoning as to 
copyright’s doctrinal safeguards,312 but did not credit the defendant’s argument as to 
the importance of the public interest.  Indeed, in the circumstances, which had 
involved unauthorized publication of the excerpt prior to the authorized release of the 
book-length biography, O’Connor thought that neither fair use nor the First 
Amendment provided a defense.  In her opinion for the Court, she offered an 
additional historic gloss on the Framers’ understanding of the relationship between 
copyright and the Amendment that Nimmer had not suggested.  “The Framers 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression,” she wrote.  “By 
                                                                                                                                                
305 See generally id. at 263–83 (discussing “[c]onstitutional [a]bsolutes in a Holmesian [w]orld” 
and historical viewpoints of absolute rights). 
306 See Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1197–99. 
307 See id. at 1189–93. 
308 See id. at 1190–91; but cf. LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 137 n.104 (noting that “a 
close reading” of Nimmer’s fair use analysis “can leave the reader in some doubt as to the 
relationship he saw between [the fair use] doctrine and the First Amendment”). 
309 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
310 Id. at 543–44; see, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1181. 
311 Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
312 See id. at 556. 
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establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”313   
This is dubious history at best.314  In the first place it is unlikely that the 
Framers intended anything more from the First Amendment than that it would 
constrain Congress against abridging freedom of speech and press, just as it said in 
so many words.  Contemporary theory, invented entirely in the twentieth century, 
does sometimes envision more for the Amendment;315 what the framers may have 
anticipated remains fair game for debate.316  It is unlikely that they intended 
copyright to be the “engine of free expression,” if by that phrase one means to link 
copyright with affirmative goals supposedly implicit in the First Amendment.  They 
were obviously not thinking of the First Amendment at all when they included the 
Copyright Clause in the original draft of the Constitution. Meanwhile, it is likely that 
they were not thinking clearly about copyright either.  As every student of the subject 
knows, the Copyright Clause was adopted without any record of debate.317  That the 
Framers may have expected something of copyright is plausible enough, but what 
that something may have been is anything but clear, and may well not have been the 
same thing from one Framer to the next.  That they imagined in 1787 that copyright 
would be the device by which they would secure what twentieth century citizens 
might one day hope for from a First Amendment not to be considered or adopted until 
1791 is altogether improbable.318 
Still, O’Connor’s fanciful metaphor in Harper & Row was of a piece with history 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, and was so nicely wrought meanwhile as 
to be all but irresistible.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft,319 a 2003 decision, Justice Ginsburg 
dutifully quoted the passage above from Harper & Row in the course of endorsing, 
yet again, that earlier decision’s adoption of Nimmer’s rationale.  “In addition to 
spurring the creation and publication of new expression,” Ginsburg intoned, 
                                                                                                                                                
313 Id. at 558. 
314 We mean to convey both of the implications in this sentence.  It is at best dubious history; it 
would do no injustice to O’Connor’s proposition to dismiss it as outright bogus.  But it is also a 
splendid example of the genre, in which Justices allow each other considerable latitude with the 
truth about the past in exchange for adaptable analogies, muscular metaphors, soaring flights of 
fancy and other forensic utilities of like kind. 
315 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 171–72: 
[N]o part of the Constitution has grown more dramatically or played a greater role 
in defining the American experience than has the First Amendment.  In the 
decades since . . . the Supreme Court’s first important decision touching upon the 
meaning of the First Amendment . . . [in 1919,] the value of the First Amendment 
has grown by measures that are beyond our ability to account for here.  Perhaps 
no complete assessment of the First Amendment’s place in American life is 
possible.  Certainly it seems likely that for most Americans the cultural value of 
the First Amendment exceeds by severalfold the value assigned to the interests 
protected by intellectual property.  From a cultural perspective it is entirely 
plausible to suggest that First Amendment interests are beyond price. 
Id. 
316 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 126–27, 127 n.74.  We are inclined to think 
Zechariah Chafee summed up that debate most persuasively when he suggested that the Framers 
“had no very clear idea what they meant.” 
317 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 277, at 2. 
318 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 124–27.  This passage especially embraces the 
position taken by Professors Lange and Powell in their book. 
319 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186 (2003). 
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“copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.  First, it 
distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for 
copyright protection . . . .  Second, the ‘fair use’ defense allows the public to use not 
only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in 
certain circumstances.”320  This was dutiful enough, but neither new nor particularly 
thoughtful in itself, since what Ginsburg had to say about this much of the subject 
amounted to little more than an echo of what had been said before. 
Yet Ginsburg’s opinion in Eldred was destined to be something more than 
merely derivative.  The petitioners in Eldred had asked the Court to weigh the 
purposes and burdens imposed by the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
(“CTEA”) against the constraints imposed by the First Amendment in the light of 
“heightened scrutiny” —this according to a hierarchy of balances that had long since 
supplanted the definitional balancing that Nimmer knew.  More specifically, the 
petitioners had argued that extending the terms of existing copyrights, as the CTEA 
would do, amounted to a content-neutral regulation of speech.321  Professors David 
Lange and Jefferson Powell have recently discussed “heightened scrutiny” in their 
book length treatment of copyright and the First Amendment: 
Contemporary First Amendment doctrine distinguishes regulations of 
expression in which the burden on expression is related to its content from 
regulations in which the burden on expression is unrelated to content.  The 
former “content-based” regulations are, the Supreme Court has said 
repeatedly, “presumptively invalid”:  in reviewing them a court must use 
“the most exacting scrutiny” to ensure that it upholds only those regulations 
that are “narrowly tailored” in order to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.  In contrast, “content-neutral” regulations that impose “an 
incidental burden” on expression are reviewed for their compatibility with 
the First Amendment under what the Court has termed “an intermediate 
level of scrutiny”:  in this case the regulation is valid if “it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”322 
On the face of the matter, heightened scrutiny might have seemed especially 
justified as against the decision below in Eldred, in which the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia had concluded that copyright was “categorically immune 
from challenges under the First Amendment.”323  Such a conclusion might have 
suggested the risks inherent in according copyright a primacy vis-à-vis the First 
Amendment that no other system of law can claim.  Yet Ginsburg’s response was 
merely to “reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a 
copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards.  ‘The copyright Clause and the First Amendment were adopted close in 
                                                                                                                                                
320 Id. at 219–20. 
321 Id. at 218. 
322 LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 116–17. 
323 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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time.  This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s monopolies are 
compatible with free speech principles.’”324 
To this rejection, which seemed clumsily reasoned but might imaginably have 
been reconciled with prior case law, including Harper & Row, Ginsburg offered an 
additional response that had no provenance at all in any decision that had gone 
before.  “We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly [in suggesting 
categorical immunity],” she allowed; but “when, as in this case, Congress has not 
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment 
scrutiny is unnecessary.”325 
One might suspect that this was essentially a throw-away line, intended to do 
little more than deflect serious criticism of her notably thin opinion on the First 
Amendment questions while deferring serious contemplation of the answers.  
However it may have been intended, a different result was bound to follow.  No one 
encountering Ginsburg’s reference to “traditional contours” could fail to wonder 
where the line implicit in that phrase might fall.  For those to whom the Court’s ill-
judged opinions on copyright and the First Amendment were anathema, if not an 
invitation to outright contempt, even a faint-hearted suggestion that at some point 
copyright might yield to concerns for a larger freedom of expression was bound to 
pose an occasion for a quest. 
B. Traditional Contours of Copyright 
What are we to understand the “traditional contours” of copyright to be?  What 
does it mean when we speak of these contours in the context of the First 
Amendment?  And why should it matter?   
The answer is that it ought to matter enormously if we think the First 
Amendment means even approximately what it seems to say.  Whatever the 
traditional configurations of copyright may be, they are surely relevant to the more 
important question of copyright’s potential for conflict with freedom of expression.  
Professor Nimmer was correct to approach this question as he did in the opening 
paragraphs of his seminal article on the subject.  He was also right to conclude that 
copyright’s traditional contours, taken at face value, appear to violate the First 
Amendment, also taken at face value. 
He was wrong, however, to conclude that copyright doctrines could serve as a 
substitute for the explicit constraints in the First Amendment.  The doctrinal 
safeguards are presumably close to the center of whatever Justice Ginsburg may 
have meant when she spoke in passing of copyright’s “traditional contours.”  But 
copyright’s doctrines and contours define the nature of their conflict with the First 
Amendment, not an excuse for wishing it away. 
That conflict results mainly from the exclusivity that copyright today generally 
presupposes, an exclusivity of the sort that figures in Golan, as it does in virtually 
every doctrinal aspect of copyright at large.326  The conflict is not lessened by the fact 
                                                                                                                                                
324 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2002). 
325 Id. at 221. 
326 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 175. 
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that copyright’s exclusivity is not total or absolute.  The idea-expression dichotomy 
and the fair use doctrine may ameliorate the conflict to a degree.  They do not 
eliminate it.  They cannot justify it.  They furnish no excuse for ignoring it.  Nimmer 
was wrong to think so.  And so has been the Court which, in following Nimmer’s lead, 
can be pardoned only on the ground that its inquiry into the matter to date has been 
so cursory as to amount to no inquiry at all.327 
And yet sometimes we can be grateful even for half measures.  If copyright is 
immune to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment only for so long as it 
falls within its traditional contours, then we can take some satisfaction in agreeing 
with the Tenth Circuit that the URAA’s withdrawal of millions of foreign works from 
the public domain, and their “restoration” to protection under American copyright 
law, are anything but traditional.328  They are in fact unprecedented, and that is so 
even if one sees the very rare, very different and very limited restoration of works 
during wartime as analogous.329  Analogous these wartime actions may be, perhaps, 
in some very distant sense, but they were anything but traditional.  Precedents for 
the URAA they are not. 
Meanwhile, the government and a handful of amici before the Court in Golan 
have argued in effect that the first copyright act in 1790 “restored” public domain 
works to protection under the first federal copyright act.330  What they mean is that 
some works long since published under prevailing colonial law suddenly became 
eligible for new federal protection.  But this argument simply misunderstands the 
nature of the newly created Constitutional version of the public domain, and its role 
as a function of the Copyright Clause.  In this new relationship, the one begat the 
other.331  There was no restoration; there was merely a beginning.  As an original 
matter, informed by the First Amendment nunc pro tunc, we might well argue that 
this beginning was also the beginning of a conflict with freedom of expression.  And 
                                                                                                                                                
In the evolution of the First Amendment to date, multiple theories addressing 
and defining freedom of expression have been advanced by scholars and courts 
alike . . . .  It is enough for the moment to note that at the center of them all is a 
common concern for the question of freedom from suppression, a concern aimed 
at realizing the well-being that follows when citizens are free not only to ‘think 
as they will’ but also to ‘speak as they think.’  Our contention here is that the 
exclusivity commonly recognized and protected among the principal intellectual 
property doctrines [with particular emphasis upon copyright] is antithetical to 
the realization of that freedom. 
Id. 
327 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 91–97.  If the Court itself labored under the so-
called “doctrinal safeguards” afforded by copyright, opinion writing would be transformed, and 
might well grind to a halt.  Id.  Ideas and holdings could still be transmitted from one case to the 
next, of course, but the customary free appropriation of language and patterns of expression from 
earlier cases would have to cease while Justices and their clerks searched for “original” ways to 
express ideas.  Id.  Fair use might help from time to time, in theory; in practice the Justices would 
soon think otherwise.  The lesson they would learn is clear.  In the supple interplay among ideas 
and expression, the one simply cannot reliably be made to serve in place of the other.  And this is so 
whether the substitution is full- or part-time. 
328 We think the Tenth Circuit’s holding on this point was correct.  See supra notes 47–56 and 
accompanying text. 
329 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
330 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 11. 
331 See Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 31. 
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we would certainly insist that in a larger sense the public domain existed, as it still 
exists, before and beyond the fact of the Copyright Clause itself.332 But incorporating 
pre-1787 works into the realm of copyright was in no sense a violation of its 
“traditional contours.”  These were only beginning to subsist.  They had yet to be 
defined. 
The government also cites examples of patent restoration in its brief, and in 
doing so underscores the essential problem in the way it sees copyright and the First 
Amendment.  Patent law and copyright are discrete doctrinal systems.  Patent law 
ordinarily does not abridge expression, and therefore has nothing to do with the First 
Amendment.  Copyright, in contrast, is “intentionally and inherently” speech 
suppressive with respect to “every grant of copyright”—exactly as the government 
itself proclaims.333 
Patent restoration thus does not speak to the issue of “traditional contours” or 
“doctrinal safeguards” in copyright.  Why, then, does the government imagine that 
the patent cases can serve as precedents in Golan?  The answer is that in the 
government’s implicit understanding of the Constitution the Copyright (or Patent) 
Clause actually stands higher than the First Amendment.  And so, in evaluating 
Congressional action under the Copyright Clause the Court is advised repeatedly and 
insistently by the government to “defer” to the legislative will.334  But of course that 
cannot be sound advice.  Were it not for the arguments advanced by Nimmer and 
artlessly embraced by the Court in Harper & Row and Eldred, the constitutional role 
reversal envisioned by the government would seem obviously flawed to any 
thoughtful student of the constitution.  Even Nimmer understood clearly that it is 
the Copyright Clause (and therefore copyright itself) that must be reconciled with the 
First Amendment, not the other way around.  Copyright is said to contain “doctrinal 
safeguards” that enable us to see that reconciliation, but only for so long as copyright 
remains within its “traditional contours.”  Patent law has nothing to contribute in 
this context.  The patent restoration cases are all simply, utterly and embarrassingly 
beside the point.335 
We have previously described the Tenth Circuit’s approach to the question of 
traditional contours.336  Its preliminary analysis on this point seems to us to be 
                                                                                                                                                
332 See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 475, 483 
(2003). 
333 Resps. Brief supra note 97, at 34. 
334 Id.  The Court reasoned that: 
The imposition of some restrictions on expressive activity is . . . the intended and 
inherent effect of every grant of copyright.  If the existence of these restrictions 
were treated as a ground for heightened judicial scrutiny under the First 
Amendment, the principle of deference to Copyright Clause legislation would 
effectively be negated. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
335 The patent restoration cases are inapposite for an additional reason.  All of these cases are 
early decisions from the nineteenth century, when the constitutional significance of the public 
domain in patent law was still evolving, and at the time were still notably lagging behind copyright.  
Today, these cases are all seriously undercut by the later decisions in Graham v. John Deere, 383 
U.S. 1 (1966), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 
(1989), which have considerably harmonized patent law with copyright insofar as the public domain 
is concerned. 
336 See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
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unassailable.  Restoration under the URAA cannot be said to be traditional in any 
sensible meaning of that term.  This was the Tenth Circuit’s own conclusion, one 
expressly occasioned by Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Eldred.  And so it appeared 
that the scenario she envisioned now lay at hand.  First Amendment scrutiny of at 
least this much of copyright could no longer be avoided. 
C. Copyright, Heightened Scrutiny, and the Question of Content Neutrality 
As we have also previously explained, heightened scrutiny comes in two forms.  
Laws that seek to abridge expression in an immediate, direct or otherwise 
inescapable sense are presumptively invalid.  Laws that abridge expression only 
indirectly, without evident concern for content qua content, are invalid if the law is 
insufficiently related to its objective, or if it appears excessive or irrational.337  The 
latter is still a form of heightened scrutiny, so it is said, but heightened just enough 
that a judge or panel of judges must review the limitation on expression.  In the end, 
thanks to a striking form of path dependency insured by the principles of judicial 
deference and stare decisis, Congressional judgment ordinarily prevails.  Heightened 
scrutiny of the lesser sort is not altogether an arid exercise, but it is often largely so.  
Its typical function is to provide a masque, from behind which a court can conceal or 
rationalize the fact that, once again, Congress has abridged expression.  In this 
conventional usage it is not merely Congress that is abridging expression but also the 
courts, and ultimately the Court.338 
It would seem to follow that lawyers for clients like the petitioners in Golan 
would inevitably insist that the URAA is content-based unless that argument is 
somehow expressly precluded by precedent.  To succeed on that ground would bring 
their clients close to victory, a fortiori.  No precedent expressly precluded that 
argument in Golan; at most it might have seemed debatable.  Yet, as we have said, 
all the parties conceded that the restoration provisions were merely content-neutral.  
The District Court judge might have overridden this concession, but did not do so; the 
Tenth Circuit followed suit on this point.339 
That concession almost certainly undercut the petitioners’ case.  As we have 
explained, the District Court did find that the legislation was impermissibly broad 
under even the lesser standard of review.  But the Tenth Circuit panel concluded 
that Congress had acted rationally, within the limits of its authority to abridge 
expression.  In our judgment the District Court was correct, for reasons implicit in a 
                                                                                                                                                
337 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 118–22; Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 
U.S. 622 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).  The Turner I and 
Turner II cases appear to have dominated the thinking of both the petitioners and the government, 
as is evidenced in their briefs before the Court, though not ultimately to the same end.  In our own 
assessment, the Turner I and Turner II cases and the “content neutrality” cases are inapposite for 
reasons we develop more fully in the text. 
338 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 143–44. 
339 See supra notes 57, 79 and accompanying text.  In the Supreme Court the parties are bound 
by their earlier positions.  One amicus brief does argue that the URAA is content-based.  See Brief of 
Info. Soc’y Project at Yale Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 101, at 3.  In 
our judgment, the position urged in the amicus brief is correct on this point for reasons we elaborate 
in our own comments in the text. 
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legislative scheme that was seriously flawed, in no small part through overreaching 
and overbreadth.  The Tenth Circuit panel’s opinion was hardly unforeseeable, 
however.  Intermediate scrutiny shifts the balance in any case decidedly in favor of 
Congressional judgment and the status quo. 
Are the restoration provisions of the URAA “content-neutral?”  No.  The URAA 
is an artifact of copyright at large in the supposed service of professional authorship.  
Copyright has never been an “engine of free expression.”  In today’s world it is the de 
facto engine of professional authorship.  Authorship itself is the antithesis of content 
neutrality.  Copyright is no less so.  Like authorship at large copyright is “content-
based” to the very core of its being. 
The practice of authorship is content-based in the same sense that the practice 
of journalism is content-based.  No one would imagine that Congress could simply 
enact a law silencing, limiting or licensing American journalists in order to encourage 
increased coverage of the day’s events by reporters working for Agence France Presse 
or Al Jazeera or the British Broadcasting Corporation.  At the very least, heightened 
scrutiny of the most exacting sort would follow.  No Article of the Constitution could 
shield such legislation.  No argument on behalf of a more enlightened public would 
suffice.  No claim of entitlement grounded in some jumped-up notion of “content 
neutrality” as to any given news story could result in “deference” to “Congressional 
discretion.”  On the contrary, a deliberate attempt by Congress to limit the practice of 
American journalism in order to manipulate public opinion in the service of global 
commerce would be seen as all the more offensive to the First Amendment as the 
legislative provisions became more comprehensive, more unyielding, more 
undiscriminating or more remote. 
And yet the professional practices of journalists and authors are in most 
important respects fundamentally the same.  What is different in their respective 
situations is that journalists are embedded in a profession that has been protected 
historically against Congressional licensing and oversight.  Theory notwithstanding, 
the actual practice of journalism has never been subjected to the strictures of 
copyright in any important way.340  Authors, on the other hand, are professionally 
enmeshed in a complex web of laws and regulations in which licensing and oversight 
are increasingly omnipresent.  These laws and regulations are no less content-based 
for the fact that they are generally sweeping and intrusive. 
As the government itself concedes, the copyright regime is in fact an engine for 
evaluating the worthiness or unworthiness of individual authorial works and 
licensing those works accordingly.  A copyrightable work must be capable of being 
weighed and found deserving according to principles of creativity, originality, and 
exclusivity established and maintained by Congress.341  For every work that receives 
protection, myriad works are rejected as correspondingly unworthy.  The copyright 
system, its programs and its principles, may have no particular interest in one 
example of expression as against another from one moment to the next; but it is quite 
wrong to imagine that copyright is “content-neutral.” 
Against this background one must wonder why the petitioners in Golan yielded 
so much as an inch of ground on the question of content neutrality.  Perhaps the 
                                                                                                                                                
340 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 72–73. 
341 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 
(1991) (noting that copyrightable expression must have a “modicum of creativity”). 
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concession was driven by a straitened understanding of the case law—in which event 
we would dissent from that reading of the cases.342 Whatever the reason may have 
been, no doubt it was professionally defensible and well-intentioned.  Yet if 
heightened scrutiny meant anything of consequence at all, the consequences of this 
concession were not unlikely to be adverse, as indeed they appear to have been to this 
point in the progress of the case. 
We have detailed the evolution of those consequences in the District Court and 
in the Tenth Circuit.  Having lost in the Tenth Circuit on the ground of heightened 
scrutiny, the petitioners have briefed the point yet again with admirable clarity and 
force; having elected to fight on this ground, they have at least given no quarter.  The 
government’s response is to argue that judicial deference must be paid to any scheme 
that Congress has bestirred itself sufficiently to ratify, and this is so whether the 
question of sufficiency is addressed in the context of the Copyright Clause or the 
First Amendment.343  Our own judgment, meanwhile, is in accord with the District 
Court’s conclusion that the scheme enacted by Congress in the URAA goes well 
beyond what might be defended under even the lesser form of heightened scrutiny.  
In the end, the function of intermediate scrutiny in Golan has been to enable three 
judges of the Tenth Circuit to excuse what all the parties concede to be a 
Congressional exercise in abridging expression.  That is the blunt and inescapable 
truth of the matter.  As such, it is an affront to the First Amendment, the public 
domain, the Copyright Clause, and copyright itself, all of which deserve better. 
But “better” does not require a zero sum game.  The risk in finding that a law or 
regulation is content-based under the existing approach to heightened scrutiny is 
that a sensible legislative scheme may fail entirely when a relatively modest 
alternative or compromise might suffice to satisfy the First Amendment’s 
constraints.  This is especially true when the context is copyright, where the present 
concept of exclusivity should be seen as anathema to freedom of expression, but 
where it is possible to imagine alternatives that do not offend, alternatives that 
Congress and the Court, like Nimmer himself, have failed to see. 
                                                                                                                                                
342 A considerable literature has appeared on the subject of content-based versus content-
neutral regulations in the context of copyright and the First Amendment.  Opinions tend to be 
closely reasoned and sharply divided.  Compare, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Intellectual Property:  Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
697, 703–17 (2003) (discussing why copyright law is a form of speech restriction, but whether or not 
copyright law is content-based simply on the grounds that it keeps people from publishing, 
producing, and performing the speech that they want to publish, produce, and perform, the fair use 
exception to copyright law, would make the laws content-based); with Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001) (discussing 
why in First Amendment terms, copyright law is a type of content-neutral speech regulation that 
should be subject to rigorous "intermediate scrutiny).  Author’s note:  we are indebted to Professor 
Lange’s former research assistant, Sandra Newmeier, Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2011, for 
an excellent memorandum collecting and summarizing this literature.  We do not intend to join in 
this debate in a plenary way.  In our view those who see copyright as predominantly content-based 
have the better of the argument. 
343 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.  As suggested, the epistemology of the 
government’s argument is one in which the First Amendment is inevitably subordinated to the 
Copyright Clause. 
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VI. ALTERNATIVES AND COMPROMISE 
A. Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment 
Professors Lange and Powell have proposed that, as between copyright and the 
First Amendment, the latter must be seen as paramount and absolute.344  In this 
embrace of First Amendment primacy, they are frankly influenced by a larger 
understanding of the Amendment most closely identified with Justices Black and 
Douglas—an understanding, as we have earlier said, that Professor Nimmer himself 
considered in the opening paragraphs of his seminal 1970 essay in which he posed 
the question:  Does copyright violate the First Amendment?345 
Though he did not quite say so, there is little reason to doubt that his ultimate 
search for an alternative understanding of the relationship between copyright and 
the First Amendment proceeded in some part from what he otherwise imagined 
would be copyright’s inevitable demise.  His alternative understanding, as we have 
also said, lay in copyright’s so-called doctrinal safeguards, set off against the First 
Amendment’s “definitional balancing” that preceded today’s “heightened scrutiny.”  
His endorsement of this understanding has led to a vast outpouring of writing about 
copyright and the First Amendment, and meanwhile to so much of what the Court 
has said about these issues in Harper & Row and Eldred, the two cases in which the 
Court has given them passing attention.  None of this writing has appeared to depart 
from the fundamental assumption that copyright and the First Amendment must be 
reconciled in order to insure that copyright survives intact.346 
In their book, Lange and Powell concur in Nimmer’s initial reasoning as to the 
troubled relationship between copyright and an absolute First Amendment.  They 
entertain no assumption, however, as to the continuing necessity of “saving” 
copyright from the consequences of whatever conflict cannot be avoided.  In their 
view copyright must yield where necessary to the greater constitutional weight of the 
Amendment.  This is especially so with respect to copyright’s traditional reliance on 
Congressional power to grant monopolies in expression.  Lange and Powell write: 
We propose . . . that the First Amendment be read absolutely, in keeping 
with its first and most obvious meaning:  that Congress shall make no law 
abridging freedom of speech or of the press by conferring monopolies in 
expression that otherwise would belong to the universe of discourses in which 
all are free to share and share alike.  In at least this sense, “no law” should 
mean no law.347 
                                                                                                                                                
344 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 305. 
345 See Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1180. 
346 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 138–42 (summarizing this literature briefly); NEIL 
WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (Oxford Press 2010) (reconciling the treatment of the 
subject). 
347 LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 305 (emphasis in original). 
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Would this lead to the demise of copyright as Nimmer and others have seemed 
to fear?  In their response to this question, Lange and Powell observe that in large 
measure copyright would continue unchanged: 
The subject matter of the doctrines, the reasons for recognizing them, the 
disposition of the underlying interests, the incentives and rewards, the 
acknowledgment of creativity itself – all of these and more remain 
essentially the same . . . . 
What [would] change most dramatically is the single thing that makes 
[copyright] obviously objectionable under the Constitution at present.  
Congress [would] simply have no power to create or recognize monopolies in 
expression that otherwise would press itself upon the public consciousness 
at large, and this is so whether the monopolies are justified under 
the . . . copyright clause, the commerce clause, the treaty power, or 
otherwise.  When exclusive interests in expression are conferred for no 
better reason than that exclusivity [would] encourage the production of such 
interests, or make them valuable in the hands of a favored few, the First 
Amendment [would] then intervene . . . . Interests in expression [would] no 
longer be consigned exclusively to proprietors recognized by the state.348 
Recognizing an absolute First Amendment primacy in Golan would change the 
nature of the argument and point the way to an outcome considerably less 
destructive to the interests of the parties on both sides.  To begin with, of course, it 
would mean abandoning the tedious and arid debate over content neutrality and its 
consequences.  No one can deny that the URAA is speech suppressive:  it is 
legislation indisputably aimed at recognizing and “restoring” exclusive rights in an 
array of works once consigned to the public domain.  This it proposes to do by 
limiting or licensing the expressive interests of parties who otherwise would rely on 
the public domain.  This much of the legislation Congress could have no power to 
enact against the reach of an absolute First Amendment. 
But it does not follow that Congress could not generally provide for an allocation 
of net revenues according to the value of a copyrighted work in the production of 
those revenues.  Professor Jed Rubenfeld proposed just such an approach to revenue 
sharing in a seminal article early in the last decade.349  Presupposing an entitlement 
to appropriate and make use of a copyrighted work, he argued that such revenues 
could be apportioned and allocated to the copyright proprietor.350  A priori rents, he 
emphasized, were not to be confused with net revenues:  the former amount to an 
impermissible impediment to appropriation, and therefore are anathema to freedom 
of expression; the latter are merely an equitable measure for sharing in the profitable 
exploitation of a work meanwhile otherwise freely available to all.351  Rubenfeld 
advanced his proposal in the context of a limited concern for what he called “freedom 
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of imagination,” but there is no reason why the proposal cannot have wider 
application.  Taking their lead from Rubenfeld, Lange and Powell have proposed the 
availability and allocation of net revenues as one way to deal with the continuing 
issue of incentives in a copyright regime that no longer recognizes exclusive interests 
in expression itself.352 
In Golan, then, a straightforward recognition of an absolute First Amendment 
would require an equally straightforward recognition by Congress that restoration 
under the URAA can be defended against the interests protected by the Amendment 
only to the extent that exclusive rights in expression are eliminated.  The provisions 
with respect to reliance parties would have to be changed or clarified so that, at most, 
post-restoration license fees did not exceed net revenues.  That could be accomplished 
rather easily, however, and in itself would affront neither the Copyright Clause nor 
the demands of the Berne Convention.  Whether restoration of a work from the public 
domain is separately inconsistent with the Copyright Clause would remain an issue 
to be resolved.  But that resolution would follow along lines no longer burdened in 
one significant respect:  no one acting, or merely contemplating action, in reliance on 
the public domain would be threatened by the prospect of licensing fees due and 
payable at the outset of an appropriation. 
Meanwhile, presumably, no continuing exclusivity within the “traditional 
contours” of copyright could long be sustained against other, more sweeping 
challenges to copyright sure to follow.  Is Golan the occasion for the adoption of a 
change in direction for the First Amendment as profound as that?  We think it is.  
For the first time in history, copyright legislation has been challenged and haled 
before the Court directly and primarily on First Amendment grounds.  It is within 
the Court’s gift under the Constitution to uphold that challenge.  To recognize the 
primacy of the First Amendment in the context of copyright is merely to reverse an 
error with a provenance of no great length, and a pedigree no more significant than 
the opinions in two half-hearted cases. 
B. A Compromise in the Service of Expression 
Finally, is it plausible to imagine that the Court may find room in the URAA 
legislation to escape the constitutional conflicts that appear inherent there, while 
saving the public domain and the First Amendment from the most immediate 
ravages wrought by that legislation?  Again, we think it is. 
As we have noted, the legislation presupposes licenses resulting from 
negotiations between the proprietors of newly restored copyright in erstwhile public 
domain works and reliance parties who may wish to continue using them.353  In the 
event of a failure to come to terms, the decision as to the fee is consigned to a federal 
court.354  It is clear that the drafters of the legislation imagined that a “reasonable” 
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fee would be imposed as to new and continuing uses; but the amount of that fee is 
unspecified.  With respect to reliance parties whose continuing uses generate little or 
no revenue it is possible that no more than a token fee need be paid.  The legislation 
does not say so explicitly, but reason to entertain that proposition can be inferred 
from a personal account of the negotiations that led to it.355  Meanwhile, given the 
lack of specificity in the language of the Act, it would seem that a “reasonable” fee for 
even a new use unlikely to produce net revenue would not necessarily require 
payment in advance. 
There is ample precedent among the Court’s intellectual property opinions for 
limiting or withholding a remedy when an act does not clearly provide for one, and 
when fairness meanwhile suggests strongly that the remedy should be modified 
accordingly.356  On the strength of these opinions a lower court might justifiably 
conclude that a fee ought to be limited at most to a stream of net revenues, rather 
than from first dollar or still earlier. 
A compromise along these lines is not unthinkable in the circumstances 
presented in Golan.  We ourselves would favor something closer to a bright line 
defense against affronts to the public domain, lest it die the death of a thousand cuts.  
But at least a compromise could be fashioned that would not violate the First 
Amendment in a primary sense.  It might lead to still more useful reflections on the 
importance of that Amendment in a world increasingly dominated by a system for 
licensing creative expression. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Golan offers the Court an opportunity to revisit an array of issues in a single 
case.  The Copyright Clause, the public domain, the Treaty Power, the First 
Amendment—no single case has ever presented issues quite as sweeping or as vital 
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to copyright and freedom of expression as this case does.  The Court’s decision could 
redirect the course of creative expression before the law.  This is an opportunity that 
has arrived not a moment too soon. 
